



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**CIVILIAN CONTROL AND MILITARY  
EFFECTIVENESS: DEFENSE REFORMS IN  
ARGENTINA AND CHILE**

by

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June 2017

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**CIVILIAN CONTROL AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS: DEFENSE  
REFORMS IN ARGENTINA AND CHILE**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis analyzes the impact that reforms in civil-military relations can have on a military's effectiveness. Specifically, why did reforms undermine military effectiveness in Argentina but not in Chile? To answer this question, this thesis looks at both countries since democratization and parses out both the civil-military reforms carried out as well as changes in effectiveness in an attempt to find linkages between the two. To allow for trend analysis, each country is broken into three discrete blocks of time and analyzed across three independent variables—decisions not made, resources, and resource allocation—in an attempt to determine their impact on the dependent variable: military effectiveness. The two case studies show that while resources and resource allocation are important, their relative importance is unclear since they trended together. The impact of decisions that were not made was inconclusive. As both countries focused on gaining civilian control yet ended in very different positions, this thesis demonstrates the need for the United States to pursue unique policies for each country with which it interacts, based on the needs, desires, and capacities that it possesses.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

CAECOPAZ	Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz
CNI	Central Nacional de Informaciones
CODELCO	Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile
DINA	Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional
EMC	Estado Mayor Conjunto
GDP	gross domestic product
IHS	information handling services
LST	landing ship, tank
MOD	ministry of defense
O&M	operation and maintenance
R&D	research and development
RESDAL	Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific exercise
UCR	Unión Cívica Radical
UN	United Nations
UNMOGIP	United Nations military observer group in India and Pakistan

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## I. FRAMING THE PROBLEM

### A. INTRODUCTION

When an 8.8 magnitude earthquake rocked Chile in 2010, President Michelle Bachelet sent in the military to restore order and keep the peace. Army units were applauded upon arrival on twenty years after the end of a dictatorship that had caused huge rifts between segments of the populace and the military.<sup>1</sup> The military's response and performance were so exemplary that when an earthquake struck Chile again in 2014, the military was called on again within only a few hours.<sup>2</sup> After wildfires wreaked havoc in Valparaiso in 2014 and 2017, the military was again called in to assist in keeping the peace, protecting property, and assisting in evacuation and firefighting, all without accusations of abuses of power.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, when President Barack Obama traveled to Argentina in March 2016, Air Force One had to be escorted by U.S. fighter planes because Argentina did not have a single operational aircraft suitable for this purpose.<sup>4</sup> Between 2012 and 2013, Argentina had one naval vessel seized and one stranded during maintenance, both for financial reasons, and one sink at the pier.<sup>5</sup> The army's kit dates to the 1970s and is in short supply and the Air Force is cutting working hours due to lack of funds.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Patrick J. McDonnell, "Chile Sends Army into Post-Quake Chaos," *Los Angeles Times*, March 3, 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/03/world/la-fg-chile-quake3-2010mar03>.

<sup>2</sup> Pascale Bonnefoy and Simon Romero, "Responding to Quake, Chile Uses Lessons of Past," *New York Times*, April 2, 2014, [https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/world/americas/earthquake-off-northern-chile-tsunami.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/world/americas/earthquake-off-northern-chile-tsunami.html?_r=0).

<sup>3</sup> "Chile Fire in Valparaiso Kills 12 and Forces Thousands to Evacuate," BBC, April 14, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-27007884> and "Chile Forest Fires: Troops Fight Against Worst Fires in Decades," BBC, January 22, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38713019>.

<sup>4</sup> Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, "Argentina's Military Decline," Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, August 30, 2016, [http://www.idsa.in/idsacomment/argentina-military-decline\\_sbmarharaj\\_300816](http://www.idsa.in/idsacomment/argentina-military-decline_sbmarharaj_300816).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> George Allison, "US Sends F-16s as Argentine Air Force Unable to Escort Air Force One," *UK Defense Journal*, July 8, 2016, <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/us-send-f-16s-argentine-air-force-unable-escort-air-force-one/>.

After returning to democracy, all countries enact reforms to bring the military institution under civilian control in order to prevent another coup d'état, a step that is commonly encouraged in newer democracies around the world as essential to democratic consolidation. However, in reforming the military, many democratizing countries end up undermining the military's capacity to fulfill their missions. When does the process of establishing civilian control over the military weaken military effectiveness, and when does it strengthen it? To answer this important question in civil-military relations, I performed an analysis of the following research question. Why did the shift to civilian control of the military undermine the effectiveness of the military in Argentina but not in Chile? In this thesis, I argue that it was the reforms that were not implemented, severe economic constraints, and poor allocation of available funds that undermined military effectiveness. Argentina experienced all three, Chile did not.

This chapter provides a literature review to address many of the main theoretical perspectives on the topics of civilian control of the military and democratic civilian control before doing the same for the concept of military effectiveness as it pertains to civil-military relations. After the literature review is the explanation of the theory and hypotheses presented in this thesis, including the dependent and independent variables. The research design used for this thesis follows next, describing the evaluation scales and units of time used for analysis.

## **B. LITERATURE REVIEW**

The research question I am attempting to answer falls squarely within the bounds of civil-military relations. The issue is not only regarding civilian control of the military, however, but also what effects have been seen in military effectiveness. For this reason, I have split the review into two sections: the first covers the spectrum from civilian to democratic civilian control of the military; and the second covers military effectiveness.

### **1. Civilian vs. Democratic Civilian Control of the Military**

In order to claim that reforms have taken place to move a country in one direction or another along the spectrum of control, I must first lay out the literature that has shaped scholars' understanding of the spectrum in the first place. The seminal work that birthed

the current ruling school of thought on civilian supremacy over the military was written by Samuel P. Huntington in 1957. In this book, Huntington does not care whether the government in question is democratic or not, as even civilian dictators can have control over their militaries.<sup>7</sup> He goes on to describe two methods of control, subjective civilian control and objective civilian control.

Under subjective civilian control, the goal is to maximize civilian power. Huntington sets the stage by describing that in this model, some civilian groups had power over the military but not all, so the impetus was to increase control over the military in order to maximize the difference in control over the military between one civilian group and its nearest civilian competitor.<sup>8</sup> Due to this framing of comparative control, there was no consensus on a definition for civilian control and with the advent of the professional officer corps, subjective civilian control became obsolete.<sup>9</sup>

Huntington continues by defining objective civilian control as “that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps.”<sup>10</sup> This type of control is achieved through maximizing military professionalism, which Huntington claims will make them “politically sterile and neutral.”<sup>11</sup> Maximizing this objective control then becomes contingent on the relation between the power of the officer corps related to civilian groups and the “compatibility of the professional military ethic with the political ideologies prevailing in society.”<sup>12</sup> His idea of professionalism is most succinctly explained when Huntington wrote in a journal prior to the publication of his book that “the professional military officer obeys the state not because he shares the outlook and values of its leadership, but simply because it is his professional

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<sup>7</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 82.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 80.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 86.

responsibility to obey.”<sup>13</sup> The military, then, should stay wholly within the bounds of military affairs and that suffices for civilian control in Huntington’s theory.

Huntington is obviously not alone in this school of thought, though others have tried to put either a caveat or a personal spin on it. Common among these scholars is the concept of some sort of legislation to explicitly state that the military is subordinate to civilian elected leaders. Jeanne Giraldo even goes so far as to say that this legislation is necessary to ensure that not only the military stays in their area of expertise, but to guarantee civil liberties, as if only the military could infringe on them.<sup>14</sup> Others have given examples of successful models, short in duration as they may have been, stressing the fact that the military serves a purely advisory role.<sup>15</sup> Some authors have provided various circumstances under which Huntington’s criteria may be met, but are either not applicable in a democratic setting, extremely nebulous, or so country specific as to not be helpful in this particular endeavor.<sup>16</sup>

While an interesting perspective, Yagil Levy’s claim that civilian control of the military is shifting from one of institutional or abstract incentives to one of market control does not seem to be shared by many others.<sup>17</sup> He purports that control is not so much of the policies the military employs so much as the way they are funded. His view seems to imply that the military is often allowed to implement whatever policy it desires, but the civilian leadership will only fund the ones that it agrees to. This is not to say that he does not have a valid point, only that it has not shifted the majority of scholars’ thinking sufficiently for them to try to build on his work.

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<sup>13</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control and the Constitution,” *The American Political Science Review* 50, no. 3 (1956): 678, JSTOR (1951551).

<sup>14</sup> Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, “Democratizing Civil-Military Relations: What Do Countries Legislate?” Occasional Paper #7 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), 6.

<sup>15</sup> Lindsay Rogers, “Civilian Control of Military Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 18, no. 2 (1940): 284–285, doi 10.2307/20028998 .

<sup>16</sup> Claude E. Welch Jr., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 5–6.

<sup>17</sup> Yagil Levy, “From Republican to Market Control over the Armed Forces: A Conceptual Framework,” *Polity* 41, no. 1 (2009): 1, JSTOR (40213491).

Of the few that have added similar comments, the main argument presented is that effective control comes from the budget process, not just the budget amount. This view adds to the democratic civilian control school of thought by showing that knowing how much money is spent on defense does not demonstrate control. What demonstrates true control is the institutionalized process of formulating the budget amount plus managing how it is spent to ensure that the expenditures are in line with the defense priorities established by the civilian leadership.<sup>18</sup> This budgeting process is broken into four steps: formulation, enactment into law, disbursement and spending, and evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness of spending.<sup>19</sup> While providing a great ideal process, it also points out the reality that many countries do not have a method to allow the civilian leadership, executive or legislative, to control how the money is spent.<sup>20</sup> This may be a function of the civilians not knowing how they want the money to be spent, as they do not all have written defense priorities to align defense spending to.

The most helpful addition to Huntington's model that still leaves it mostly in tact has been presented by Michael Desch. In this, he sidesteps the assumption of professionalism and lays out a foundation of what creates strong civilian control of the military through a look at influences external to the government and the military. His simplistic baseline for the existence of civilian control of the military rests on whether civilians or the military prevail when their interests are at odds.<sup>21</sup> This framework uses a two by two chart of high and low internal or external threats to try and demonstrate the ideal scenario.<sup>22</sup> In the two quadrants depicting a questionable strength of civilian control, he posits that military doctrine plays a major role, that is, which, how, and where

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<sup>18</sup> Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, "Defense Budgets, Democratic Civilian Control, and Effective Governance," in *Who Guards the Guardians and How*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 183–184.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 178.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 183.

<sup>21</sup> Michael Desch, "Threat Environments and Military Missions," in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 13.

<sup>22</sup> Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 14.

military resources will be used.<sup>23</sup> Taken at face value, the model appears to be quite useful, however he admits it is based on intuition and attempts to show that participation in an external war and an absence of coups go hand in hand.<sup>24</sup> Of his 23 cases, all are squarely in line with his theory and he does not show the possibility of outliers, much less counterexamples like the Russian Revolution, leading to a valid question about whether the data is skewed.

Huntington's approach, while still very prevalent in the theoretical world, has started to come under increased scrutiny.<sup>25</sup> Some of these challenges come in the form of critiques of Huntington's work and others in the form of alternate theories, usually both. Those that critique Huntington point out very valid points. First of all, the claim of obsolescence of subjective civilian control has not kept governments from using these techniques. Peter Karsten points out that the presence or absence of subjective civilian control is not a useful criterion to determine civilian control because while some countries have used it effectively in some cases, this "is not to say that it is a sensible policy for those or other governments under all circumstances."<sup>26</sup> Karsten also points out that keeping the officer corps completely segregated from society to the extent required for them to not have political opinions is completely unrealistic. He explains that for the military to truly be under civilian control, it must, as an organization, believe that that it should be.<sup>27</sup>

Some scholars have attacked Huntington's theory based on his statements regarding professionalism, pointing out that it is more of a definition than a variable. In many minds, Huntington's logic is circular, seeming to claim that professional officers will obey the state because obeying the state is what makes them professional. Thus, any officer that does not obey the state was not professional to begin with. Samuel Finer points out that "professionalism is not, therefore, what Huntington says it is – the sole or

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<sup>23</sup> Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 17.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>25</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 14–16.

<sup>26</sup> Peter Karsten, *Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Garland, 1998), 231.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 237.



even the principal force inhibiting the military's desire to intervene. To inhibit such a desire, the military must also have absorbed the principle of the supremacy of the civil power. For this is *not* part of the definition of 'professionalism.' It is a separate and distinct matter."<sup>28</sup> Surprisingly, Finer even wonders why the military ever obeys the civilians, whether civilian control is even natural.<sup>29</sup> This sentiment is even shared, though reworded, by Zoltan Barany when he claimed that the sheer possibility of democratic consolidation, which naturally includes civilian control of the military, rests squarely on the military elites' political preference to allow it to happen.<sup>30</sup> His pessimism regarding a useful general theory is based in large part on the diversity of political and socioeconomic histories and conditions of democratic or democratizing states.<sup>31</sup>

The strongest critiques of the Huntington school of thought comes from those who claim that it is too general and outdated in the changing political landscape to still be useful at face value.<sup>32</sup> A good portion of this argument comes from the perspective of a more holistic approach to civil-military relations which includes more than a static snapshot of whether civilian control exists at a particular time. This new approach argues for the importance of healthy institutions that solidify and perpetuate civilian control in a manner that is useful to the government. This is the approach, which due to its nature is particular to democracies, that has taken the name of democratic civilian control of the military. This institutional role is not as abstract as the Huntington school presents, instead listing some specific roles that these institutions must play. One author emphasized this in saying that "civilian control does not exist unless it is grounded in and exercised through institutions ranging from organic laws that deal with the Ministry of Defense or oversight committees, to budget processes and civilian control of officer promotions. If these institutions are not in place and functioning, democratic civilian

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<sup>28</sup> Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (1962; repr., New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002), 28.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 1–5.

<sup>30</sup> Zoltan D. Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 3.

<sup>31</sup> Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State*, 4.

<sup>32</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, ed., *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 4.

control is only a façade.”<sup>33</sup> Others in this vein of thought show how what is important is not so much the mission or operation that the military is conducting, but who is ultimately calling the shots in when and how actions initiate, are carried out, and terminated.<sup>34</sup>

The debate continues among all scholars, however, on what specific missions fall under the military’s core functions. Most agree that core functions are “defense” related, which seems to mean strictly combat/weapons related.<sup>35</sup> This seems to blatantly ignore, for example, the reconstruction capabilities internal to militaries, which typically are carried out by specialized units due to its inherent need in a combat environment. The training and application-related benefits of these missions seem to disappear in scholars’ minds if these units use their skillsets in a peacetime environment to help civilians, rather than a defense environment to aid the war effort. These opinions could lead a scholar to criticize military missions such as the use of a construction battalion to fix a road after a landslide when a private company could have been used.

There is obvious benefit in lasting civilian control, making it natural that “if civilian control is to endure, it must be institutionalized. For that to occur, there should be strong, well-staffed, civilian-led organizations which are designed to maximize civilian authority and control over defense policy.”<sup>36</sup> There is disagreement, in this regard, on whether retired military officers should be considered civilians or lumped in with active military members on the premise that their loyalties may be divided.<sup>37</sup> This can become an important qualifier in countries that are still creating a defense ministry which might not have any institutional knowledge on defense among the civilian staff.

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<sup>33</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau and Harold A. Trinkunas, *Global Politics of Defense Reform* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 13.

<sup>34</sup> David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers? Military Missions and Civilian Control in Democratic South America,” *Armed Forces and Society* 26, no. 3 (2000): 420–421.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 417.

<sup>36</sup> David Pion-Berlin, “Latin American Civil-Military Relations: What Progress Has Been Made?” in *Debating Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*, ed. David R. Mares and Rafael Martinez (Chicago: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), 62.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 74–75.

In this newer school of thought, control is not the end-all, be-all. It must be grown, nurtured, and inculcated not just in the military, but in the civilian leadership as well. In democratic civilian control, this control is not held by just the executive branch, but also, and perhaps equally, by the legislative branch.<sup>38</sup> The level of effective control can be measured against things like whether and how oversight authority is actually employed, not just in the existence of this authority.<sup>39</sup> This employment could take shape in the form of oversight mechanisms, shaping professional norms both within the military and the civilian defense institution, or the more obvious institutional control functions.<sup>40</sup>

Harold A. Trinkunas joined this group by defining two types of institutionalized civilian control: control by containment and control by oversight. In control by containment, officials do not care what the military is up to so long as the military stays in its prescribed sandbox. By contrast, he argues that the main characteristics of the understanding of democratic civilian control are embodied in control by oversight, which “exists when politicians and bureaucrats are able to determine defense policies and approve military activities through an institutionalized professional defense bureaucracy.”<sup>41</sup>

This democratic control model presents a much more useful framework to use in order to create a spectrum of control with specific items to aid in identifying movement along the spectrum, regardless of direction. For many in this school of thought, however, control of a military is pointless if they cannot accomplish their missions. This brings up the issue of military effectiveness.

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<sup>38</sup> Larry L. Watts, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 30, no. 1 (2002): 61, ProQuest (206657513).

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 61.

<sup>40</sup> Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 30.

<sup>41</sup> Harold A. Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 5–6.

## 2. Military Effectiveness

The link between control of the military, whether civilian or democratic, and military effectiveness is not hypothetical or minor. If strong control exists but effectiveness does not, the blame can likely be squarely placed on the civilians controlling the military, creating tension and animosity, not to mention risking national security.<sup>42</sup> The connection is sometimes seen, as evidenced in NATO countries, but elsewhere “there is an almost total absence of attention to the institutional and other requirements for military effectiveness.”<sup>43</sup> An increase in control, however, does not necessarily lead to either an increase or decrease in effectiveness. Matei points out that “while too much direction and oversight obviously can hamper the security services’ capabilities...implementing ‘good’ control, i.e., instituting control and oversight in a way that provides top-level direction and general oversight guidance as opposed to malfeasance or cronyism, leads to improved effectiveness.”<sup>44</sup>

Parading its importance and giving measurable qualifiers are two separate issues. While openly admitting that giving a quantitative assessment of a nation’s military effectiveness is difficult at best, some have postulated benchmarks that work as very logical wickets. According to Matei, there are three things which must all be present to be able to claim effectiveness. First is the presence of a plan, strategy, or doctrine. In this context, these documents would take the form of a national security strategy, counterterrorism doctrine, or white paper on defense or security. Second is the presence of a structure and process in place to both create or modify these documents on the front end, and implement them appropriately on the back end. These structures could be a Joint Staff, defense ministry, or security council. Third, these plans must be backed by resources that include not only money, but personnel and political capital so that the armed forces can get the training, equipment and authority to complete the missions set for them. These three aspects must all be met for a force to be effective in any given

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<sup>42</sup> Bruneau and Trinkunas, *Global Politics of Defense Reform*, 59.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>44</sup> Matei, “New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 34.

mission area.<sup>45</sup> This framework is somewhat muddled by the same author later stating that in the case of Argentina, effectiveness is a low-level priority, evidenced by the legal restriction on internal conflict-related missions.<sup>46</sup> This is confusing because while the missions available to the military are legally limited, this should not affect the military's ability to fulfill the missions that are allowed.

Other frameworks mention the need for joint operations to consider an armed force to be fully effective, although this seems to look at effectiveness at the macro level, not for a particular mission category.<sup>47</sup> In the current threat environment, not that in this case it is necessarily different from threat environments of the past, it seems likely that well-executed joint operations would be considered more effective than otherwise.

In a historical review of military operations by great powers, another framework was presented, though much more detailed and cumbersome for general research. In it, the authors argue that the military's organizational effectiveness has both vertical and horizontal aspects. The vertical dimension encompasses preparation and execution of war at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Within each vertical level are encompassed the myriad horizontal tasks that must be accomplished to ensure that that level is proficiently dealt with. While these vertical benchmarks overlap to some degree, an assessment of effectiveness needs to be performed at each individual level as they each have unique goals and procedures.<sup>48</sup> Needless to say, this framework is very tedious and too involved for one individual to employ.

A separate study defined an effective military in relation to civilian control of the military. This definition included five components: (1) the ability to transform political input into military output, (2) the ability to effectively use available options to improve

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<sup>45</sup> Matei, "New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," 32.

<sup>46</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Asserting Civilian Control: Argentina," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 151.

<sup>47</sup> David Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 145.

<sup>48</sup> Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, ed., *The First World War*, vol. 1 of *Military Effectiveness* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 2.

military capabilities, (3) a readiness to defend the state in both kinetic and non-kinetic environments, (4) the ability to accomplish these missions within assigned time and resource limits, and (5) the ability to minimize losses in all areas while still successfully accomplishing the mission assigned.<sup>49</sup> The downside to this particular definition is that if a particular military does not get called out to perform a particular mission, it will not be able to present any data by which to assess its ability to meet these criteria. It also seems to merge the concepts of effectiveness and efficiency, limiting its usefulness in this particular case.

These definitions and frameworks are all similar in that they do not equate victory with effectiveness at face value. There is obviously a relationship between the two, but not one that can be universally attributed as it will be dependent on the adversary as much as the military in question. Also, while there may be numerous other criteria put forward by other scholars to define an effective military, these presented are taken to be characteristic of those found in other literature.

### **C. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES**

My theory is that three things impacted (DV) military effectiveness in the two case studies: (IV 1) decisions not made, (IV 2) resource levels, and (IV 3) resource allocation. In some time periods, the independent variable with the greatest impact is obvious; however, there are also times when have more equal impact.

While civilian control of the military is an important goal, as in any process, there are side effects to every decision that is made. Sometimes it is the fact that a decision was not made that causes the problem. For example, restricting the budget to account for economic hardships nation-wide and refocusing the military in order to achieve a stated objective is a great plan. The problem comes when manning is not also adjusted to match the new budget and mission set, leading the reduced funding to only cover personnel costs, with nothing left to fund training and sustainment efforts toward the new or redefined missions. These effects must be understood in order to enact policy or

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<sup>49</sup> Branimir Furlan, "Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness: Slovenian Case," *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 3 (2012): 438, doi: 10.1177/0095327X12459167.

legislation in a way that will benefit not only the civilian leadership, but also the military, in order to get any benefit from the money spent on defense. This is but one example, but it demonstrates that reform is an effort that while tackled piecemeal as civilians gain initiative and political capital over time, still has incremental effects that do not wait for long term plans to be completed.

As in any part of government, the ambitions and desires of leaders are restricted by the money they have at their disposal. Those with sufficient money can afford to buy certain platforms and equipment, train frequently, and invest in infrastructure updates and upgrades. Governments without excess money at their disposal have to make cuts somewhere, whether it be in personnel levels, force shaping to not be top heavy, selling equipment, or just shelving plans for acquisitions or investments. One or two of these cuts is not a problem, and every country goes through this process as no country works in a resource unconstrained environment, and in the short term there is no noticeable change in effectiveness. The degradation becomes much more apparent when over ten or twenty years there are patterns of continuously pushing acquisitions and updates, training investments, and modernization efforts off to the point where the current inventory becomes obsolete on a large scale. This problem has lots of gradation between the two options as each country's financial circumstances will change slightly on an annual basis, but the impact it necessarily has on effectiveness is undeniable.

A major debate in legislatures and finance ministries across the globe is the annual budget. Where money is spent makes a country's priorities easier to pinpoint, as the biggest concern or biggest pillar of strength deserves the most fixing or protection, respectively. This concept also carries down to the lower levels of expenditures. Within a particular defense ministry, the money will be spent where that ministry's priorities lie. If building a new training center for peacekeeping operations is the top priority, it will get the money it needs, leaving less to trickle into other projects. This is simple prioritization. This impacts effectiveness when the nation is operating under severely constrained financial conditions to where they cannot fund all of their mission areas. If a particular mission area is neglected for long enough, or the financial crisis is deep enough, the required investments to modernize that mission area may be too expensive to accomplish.

Even the United States, which spends more on defense than any other country in the world, cannot afford to use only the most high-tech equipment in every mission area. For better or worse, those underfunded mission areas will suffer in effectiveness.

Democracies do not consolidate by themselves, nor are they instantaneously consolidated and blessed with perfect civil-military relations at the moment of democratization. This process of ensuring democratic civilian control takes time and reform. Not all reforms are created equal, however, and while in theory certain reforms may be necessary, the order and manner in which they are implemented will necessarily affect their outcome. Some will leave a military stronger, more focused, and better able to accomplish its missions; others will leave it stranded and searching for direction. The goal here is to separate these two. The other side of the coin asks why particular reforms were enacted. It could easily be argued that making a military less effective is a good thing, especially if what they are effective at in the first place is staging coups. This intention behind the reform, while not necessarily impacting how the reform is carried out, sheds light on the mindset of the reformers and helps explain why they thought a particular reform was necessary over others. Understanding the opposition's perspectives and viewpoint can shape what, when, and how reforms are implemented.

My hypothesis is that the difference between the level of military effectiveness in Chile and Argentina is due to the three variables of reforms not made, available resources, and resource allocation. In Chile, the Copper Law continues to provide the military with a prerogative that ideally should belong to the legislature, and while this has not helped increase democratic civilian control, it has ensured that the military has had the funding to maintain a modernized force for the region. In Argentina, conscription was eliminated in 1994 but the lack of a defense-wide manning overhaul has left higher numbers of career service members than during the junta's high military budget, with fewer missions and a smaller budget.<sup>50</sup> Available resources in Chile have been much higher than in Argentina as Chile has had a much more stable economy while Argentina

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<sup>50</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1983–1984* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), 104 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1995–1996* (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 203–4.



has dealt with rampant inflation and national defaults over the years. Last, Chile has spent its normal budget on personnel and operations, while still having the money from the Copper Law to invest in acquisitions, which allowed Chile to purchase the equipment it needed to accomplish its stated missions. Argentina, in contrast, has spent the vast majority of its money on salaries and pensions, with very little going to modernization, and next to nothing going to research and development and investments.

#### **D. RESEARCH DESIGN**

For this thesis, I chose Argentina and Chile as the cases for a most-similar systems research design. In calling them most-similar, I am working under the following information. First, they share Spanish colonial history, both of which ended in the same year, and expectedly, the same language and predominant religion. Second, they have both had significant military involvement in politics throughout the twentieth century, oscillating between authoritarianism and democracy. Third, they have had similar amounts of time to consolidate democracy and strengthen civilian control of the military since their last respective returns to democracy. Fourth, they have similar economic strength in terms of GDP per capita (PPP), ranking 80 and 81 in the world.<sup>51</sup> Fifth, both countries have also undergone numerous election cycles without military intervention and have seen both right and left leaning regimes hold office.

I used what John Gerring calls a hypothesis-generating model to select the cases, which generated the hypotheses used in the subsequent hypothesis-testing model.<sup>52</sup> The variables are the reforms and changes made to the defense institution with the intended outcome of increased civilian control. The outcome is whether military effectiveness increased or decreased as a result of these reforms. These two countries are compared in an attempt to shine a light on potential trends that could then be further researched. This further research, while not within the scope of this thesis, could help to better formulate

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<sup>51</sup> “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed September 2, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook>.

<sup>52</sup> John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 131–132.

U.S. policy in nation-building scenarios where democracy has been intermittent or is newly enacted.

In order to find potential trends in strengthening civilian control of the military, I broke both countries into timeframes based on presidencies. I then identified any trends in reform and made an effectiveness determination based on its ability to perform primary and secondary missions by looking at the budget, personnel levels, training, joint interoperability, and platforms/equipment. The three time periods in Chile are two under the Concertación coalition including Presidents Aylwin and Frei (1990-2000) and Lagos and Bachelet (2000-2010) and the conservative administration of President Piñera (2010-2014). The three time periods in Argentina are those under Alfonsín (1983-1989), Menem (1989-1999), and the husband/wife combo of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner (2003-2015). I chose to segment it this way to try and capture the reforms enacted under each administration as they pertain to that administration's greater defense goals or policy trajectory.

Structural factors such as international pressure, economic downturns, or social divides can be instrumental in seeing the big picture. They can shape motivations for reform, impact the way reforms are enacted, or prevent intended outcomes from being realized. For these reasons, incentives and motivations must be incorporated along with an understanding of the macro level environment in which they were grown. Also, Argentina was unique in that it suffered a disastrous military defeat in the war against Great Britain in 1828, though this fact could have influenced the military to either hide in shame or work to redeem itself.

In some cases, legislation was enacted but not fully enforced until many years later. In these situations, the reforms are only credited at the time of their enforcement or implementation. This is to keep the resulting effects tied to the reform, if such ties exist, rather than looking for an institutional change where we know there isn't one.

In order to claim that civilian control of the military has been strengthened, a framework with definitions must be established. As there is no consensus among scholars on what constitutes the minimum or even maximum civilian control, I have chosen

endpoints to use for my analysis, and any movement along this spectrum will then be identifiable. As a starting point, the minimum required for civilian control of the military is that a civilian be legally appointed as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, whether as the head of state or not. This gives me a starting point and does not even require that the regime be democratic. On the other end of the spectrum I will place democratic civilian control. This will be defined as a government (1) where in a policy dispute between civilians and the military, the civilians prevail every time, (2) where control of the military is not limited to general policy guidance but to all aspects of national defense strategy, planning, and doctrine, (3) where control is checked between the executive and the legislature, and the military is subordinate to the judiciary, (4) where the defense ministry is run and populated by career civilians, (5) where civilians control the creation and execution of the defense budget, (6) where military promotions require civilian approval, (7) where oversight of military programs and operations is frequent and effective, and (8) where the professional norms are adjustable and controlled by the civilian government in order to continuously direct those norms in the direction that society needs them to move. This definition is created by pulling together various perspectives and then expanding them in order to go beyond every currently existing government. This definition is based on all eight aspects being 100% true at all times. Essentially, any reform that grants more control to the civilian leadership, whether it enhances military effectiveness or not, will be considered a move toward democratic civilian control.

In this thesis, it is not the absolute position of the government along the spectrum that is important, only the relative motion along the spectrum. If it is a small step toward improving civilian control, it does not matter whether the starting point is at the far left or somewhere in the middle. The reason that the absolute position on the spectrum does not matter is because the purpose of this thesis was to try and determine the manner in which each position change affected that nation's military effectiveness, not to determine how much further a nation needs to reform to achieve global approval.

Accomplishing the change in effectiveness determination was much more difficult and much more subjective. I defined ineffective as the military being unable to

accomplish any of its primary or secondary mission areas, and effective if it can accomplish every mission area every time. Each nation has different mission areas defined for its military, so in fairness to each nation's sovereignty, I did not grade effectiveness in a mission area not assigned, regardless of any international opinion on whether it should be a mission area or not. To determine movement along the effectiveness spectrum, I chose to use the budget, personnel levels, training, joint interoperability, and platforms/equipment. For budgetary issues, I looked at the breakdown between Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Personnel (active, reserves, and retired with all associated costs), Research and Development (R&D), and Acquisitions. To make a determination, I considered whether acquisitions was funded sufficiently to effect modernization efforts, and whether personnel costs allowed enough money for O&M to allow units to train and conduct exercises, much less execute missions.

Central to this thesis was tying the political decision to reform the defense institution to a resulting change, or not, in effectiveness. In some cases, decisions may have been made to increase the budget, only to have inflation devalue the amount spent and look like a decrease in effectiveness. This was controlled for by comparing trends in both budgets and inflation. Similarly, it is possible that external factors could impact both civilian control and effectiveness in the same direction but for unrelated reasons. Both of these possibilities were mitigated as much as possible by, for example, looking at trends over a longer period of time in an effort to minimize the effects of external influences. Changes in civilian control had a stated objective which made it easier to find a related change in effectiveness, however some reforms had unintended consequences. In such cases I tried to determine any changes that seemed to be related by timing, though if results were delayed it became impossible to determine all downstream effects.

To capture all this data in a coherent fashion, this thesis will address the transition to democracy in Chile and Argentina from the perspectives of the major players: the outgoing dictators and the newly elected Presidents. This chapter will present the lens each leader used to view not only the transition itself but their options moving forward with regards to civil-military relations. Once the starting point is presented, a case study

for each country will follow in separate chapters to discuss what changes those leaders felt they could afford to make in civil-military relations based on the lens presented. These case studies will also point out any changes in effectiveness that can be linked to the reforms mentioned. Last, the conclusion summarizes the successes and failures of reforms in order to recommend a way forward and warn against potential pitfalls.

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## **II. INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS OF TRANSITION: DID CIVILIANS KNOW WHAT THEY WERE UP AGAINST?**

Latin America has seen myriad transitions from tyranny to democracy over the years, but the shadow of military rule has always returned in short order; the military strong man culture has deep roots in the region. This history, however, has not led to a return to military dictatorship in South America in over twenty-five years. While democratic longevity is an incredible feat, the transition is what sets the stage for the future interaction between the military and the politicians. The politicians are responsible for not only leading the nation moving forward, but also addressing the actions of the military during the dictatorship in a way that will satisfy the public and simultaneously avoid another coup d'état.

After seventeen years of military rule in Chile and seven in Argentina, the political elites had many grievances against the armed forces for their actions. In Chile, what began as an attempt to save the nation from turmoil led to a repressive regime that killed, tortured, and disappeared thousands of civilians, many of whom were innocent. Being a leftist or opposition sympathizer was grounds for arrest and once you were in the system, what life they let you have was not easy. In Argentina, what began as a mission to eliminate insurrection and terrorism led to a nation-wide crackdown that lasted seven years and saw tens of thousands killed, tortured, and disappeared. Left-leaning political views were also looked at as dangerous in Argentina, however the military was not so picky as in Chile. These extreme measures that the militaries went to under the umbrella of defending the nation from subversives created massive rifts in society. Most importantly for this thesis, they dramatically demonstrated the dire need for civil-military reforms to gain civilian supremacy and at the same time left civilians wondering if by even proposing the necessary reforms they would convince the military to step back into the political spotlight to defend itself.

Did the politicians understand the military mentality moving forward? What did the military and the politicians need to understand about each other to ensure that the transition would progress smoothly and create an environment where the civilians felt

that their control of the military was not just de jure, but de facto? Were their views accurate? Was the stage set properly in either country to lead to a stronger, more consolidated democracy with civilian control of the military? In Chile, it was their fear of the military and its capabilities that led the incoming regimes to move slowly yet confidently toward institutionalized civilian control, working to create improved civil-military relations and a stronger democratic society. By understanding their political starting point and the military's bounds for tolerance, the politicians were able to navigate through the transition process and work toward shifting the power in the defense realm away from the military, while keeping them legally accountable for their previous actions. In Argentina, the politicians did not understand the military and its perspectives. With the hurried transition and the military reeling from multiple failures, politicians saw an opportunity to cut the military down at the knees and started swinging. This did not result in another military takeover only because the military was not interested in the political quagmire anymore. Institutionalization of civilian control has occurred on paper, but the expertise to properly manage the defense industry has had trouble materializing in Argentine's civilian sector.

#### **A. CHILE**

When General Augusto Pinochet turned over the Chilean government to the newly elected Concertación government, he did so from a position of power and control. President Patricio Aylwin, with the unenviable job of returning Chile to democracy while retaining Pinochet as his Army Chief of Staff, was well aware of the delicate situation he found himself in. On the one hand, Aylwin had some confidence that the military would stay in their barracks since Pinochet had offered the plebiscite that led to the transition of power in the first place. This confidence was somewhat overshadowed by the concern that if the pro-military conditions of the transition were abandoned then the calculus would change.

Everyone knew that the military had been asked to step in in 1973 when President Salvador Allende, a socialist, started taking the government and the country in a sharply



leftist direction.<sup>53</sup> What was not clear at the time was that the military would stay in power and rather than just depose the president, would try to fix things themselves, including internal security concerns, the economy, and education. This was a change in the expected role of the military in a country where they were known for their institutional role of protecting the nation, sometimes even from itself, but not running the country.

When the military did not give up its power shortly after Allende was removed, the nation went through a few years of internal strife and violent protest. It was during this period that the military's atrocities mostly occurred, with thousands killed or disappeared. Many of those who were victims of this show of military force were left leaning groups that very quickly found it safer in other countries than in Chile. Over the next several years, while the violence was mostly abated, the leftist political groups were pushed into hiding and the military quickly gained and held control of the media. Starting in the 1980s, world opinion started to shift toward a greater understanding and appreciation for human rights enforcement. This sentiment was already prominent in the leftist groups within Chile that continued to call for justice in whatever way they could, and the global community soon joined in. Pinochet, the leader of the ruling junta in Chile, became one of those targeted by the global community, even if he received mixed messages from foreign governments themselves.<sup>54</sup> While Pinochet had already announced the plebiscite years earlier, this international pressure added another dimension to the political discussions taking place in Chile.

Though confident in his ability to remain in control, Pinochet passed a law that granted immunity to the military covering the time period of the coup up to the date of the law in 1978. This law claimed that the military could not be prosecuted for actions taken during this period as they had been part of a patriotic mission.<sup>55</sup> While this law

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<sup>53</sup> Gregory B. Weeks, "The 'Lessons' of Dictatorship: Political Learning and the Military in Chile," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 21, no. 3 (2002), 403–4, JSTOR (3339687).

<sup>54</sup> Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S., in Reversal, Faults Chileans Over Rights Issue: It Asks U.N. Panel to Support an American Resolution Denouncing Pinochet," *New York Times*, March 13, 1986, A1, ProQuest (111056938).

<sup>55</sup> Patricio Silva, "Searching for Civilian Supremacy: The Concertación Governments and the Military in Chile," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 21, no. 3 (2002), 383, JSTOR (3339686).

protected the military from legal prosecution, it did not protect them from prosecution in the court of public opinion. Considering the economic gains and educational improvements seen during the military regime's rule, not to mention the government's control of the media, the plebiscite was not seen as a major threat to the regime. Once the plebiscite votes were cast in opposition to the ruling junta, there was no longer any way for the military to stay in power and legitimately claim it was still pursuing a patriotic mission. By underestimating the appeal of the "No" campaign, the military found itself handing power to the civilians. In defending his opinion that he had not been a dictator, Pinochet later said that had he really been a true dictator, he never would have allowed elections.<sup>56</sup>

The military and civilian spheres of opinion do not often align very well. From one perspective, this is a good thing; if they shared the same opinions and goals, then the military might be politicized to the point of feeling obligated to interfere in politics and replace the elected officials deemed unfit for their current positions. This could be a fear in countries where the civilians in power and the military work too closely together. The same outcome can come from countries, even those like Chile with long histories of peaceful transitions of power between elected officials, where the rift between the military and civilians is great enough. If the military has, and deems necessary, institutional sovereignty and has claimed to be the guarantor and protector of the state, the armed forces can similarly find themselves in a position where they feel obligated to replace the current government with a better one. Many of the political elites in Chile understood this role of the military and used it to their advantage in 1973 when they requested the military step in and remove President Allende. The claim was that he was violating the constitution with many of his reforms and actions and that this justified military intervention.<sup>57</sup> Even after 15 years of military rule, however, public opinion polls taken in 1988 before the plebiscite show that terrorism and general safety were

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<sup>56</sup> "Las Frases para el Bronce de Pinochet," *La Nación*, December 11, 2006, [http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus\\_noticias/site/artic/20061210/pags/20061210221221.html](http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias/site/artic/20061210/pags/20061210221221.html).

<sup>57</sup> Weeks, "The 'Lessons' of Dictatorship," 403–4.

considered to be among the top concerns of the population.<sup>58</sup> It is important to note, however, that so too were human rights violations. This almost seems a role reversal where the leftist parties were trying to retake the government in order to protect the country from the military.

### **1. The Civilians' Lens**

The civilians that took over in 1990 were from the left-leaning coalition of parties that had mostly been repressed and oppressed during the previous regime. This surely influenced the lens they used to view the situation not only in politics but in the nation writ large. Freedom of the press was stifled during Pinochet's reign, and while the "No" campaign had air time during the build-up to the plebiscite, they were only allotted fifteen minutes per night while the government controlled air time the rest of the day.<sup>59</sup> After seventeen years of having to carefully craft an argument so as not to appear to be even sympathetic to Marxist ideals, the coalition was careful to not give the military strong reasons to control its narrative.<sup>60</sup>

The coalition was cautious but at times it was also bold. During the presidential election campaign, the Concertación platform argued that the military should be held accountable for its actions during the dictatorship.<sup>61</sup> The civilians wanted justice, they wanted closure, and they wanted to put this episode of tyranny behind them. Of the main concerns going forward, the coalition pursued human rights protections, freedom of speech, and military subordination to civilian authority as the three main issues needing immediate attention. Getting the military back into its barracks would be a difficult task, but the military's internal regulations specified that military members were prohibited

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<sup>58</sup> "Encuesta Nacional de Opinión Pública," rev. 31, Centro de Estudios Públicos, 1988, accessed December 9, 2016, [www.cepchile.cl/cep/site/artic/20160303/asocfile/20160303183856/rev31\\_encuesta.pdf](http://www.cepchile.cl/cep/site/artic/20160303/asocfile/20160303183856/rev31_encuesta.pdf).

<sup>59</sup> Adolfo Aguilar Zinser et al., "The Chilean Plebiscite: A First Step Toward Redemocratization," Latin American Studies Association, 2, <https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/reports/ChileanPlebiscite.pdf>.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Claudio A. Fuentes, "After Pinochet: Civilian Policies Toward the Military in the 1990s Chilean Democracy," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42, no. 3 (2000), 120, JSTOR, doi: 10.2307/166440.

from protesting or from participating in politics, something which the opposition had no trouble reminding the military of.<sup>62</sup> The 1980 constitution, which legally established the military as a guardian and guiding institution for the government, was amended in 1989 through negotiations with the left and right wing coalitions, to a position of giving recommendations and advice.<sup>63</sup> This was closer to the civilians' perception of where the military should be, but there was still lots of military involvement or influence at all levels of government.

From the perspective of the incoming coalition, the *de jure* role of the military was to protect the country from external threat and internal issues the police could not handle as directed by the President, not as an independent actor which chooses when and how to intervene.

## **2. Policy Constraints and Military Pushback**

It is important to distinguish between the political power afforded to the military and its right-wing sympathizers in the constitution, and the personal power and protection afforded to the military and police forces. The political power of the military, while strong, was more of a buffer to protect the military from a tarnished image and prosecution. Under Pinochet's 1980 constitution and 1989 Organic Law of the Armed Forces, the National Security Council would be predominantly military and would have broad veto power over the president.<sup>64</sup> There were also nine appointed senatorial seats that the administration could designate. Many had requirements stipulating who could be selected so those seats were initially filled with pro-military senators. The electoral system was also modified to give significant aid to the right-wing politicians that were expected to not fare well in the elections. These laws, along with an increased vote threshold for future constitutional amendments, showed the politicians that the military

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<sup>62</sup> Zinser, "The Chilean Plebiscite," 3.

<sup>63</sup> "Constitutional History of Chile," ConstitutionNet, accessed December 12, 2016, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-chile>.

<sup>64</sup> Wendy Hunter, "Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru," *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 3 (1997), 456, JSTOR (2657566).

was not going to disappear from the political landscape.<sup>65</sup> The opposition, those politicians opposing the military junta, was able to negotiate these conditions slightly in their favor before taking office, but the situation clearly shows that the military gave up some power, it was not taken from them against their will.<sup>66</sup>

The Aylwin administration showed remarkable adaptability as he quickly found his campaign plan of prosecuting human rights abuses untenable and instead pushed for reconciliation. The military may have needed to be punished and the families of the disappeared and killed certainly wanted to see justice done, but the coalition quickly realized it was not a viable option to prosecute all involved. This was especially the case when the military refused to acknowledge that it had done anything wrong. In 1994, Pinochet was quoted as asking “who are we going to ask forgiveness from? Those who tried to kill us? Those who tried to liquidate the country?”<sup>67</sup> There were serious constraints in place that protected the military and its prerogatives, but the coalition would work through those constraints to make whatever gains it could.

Once the transition back to democracy had taken place, this dynamic seems to have changed. There are aspects of the military’s pushback to legislative changes that seem to be more of a case of legacy protection or institutional autonomy more so than their duty to protect the nation. The argument could be made that while the changes proposed by the Concertación prompted the military to protest, it was because the military’s ability to protect the nation in the future from internal threats was being challenged. It is true that in fact this may have been the case originally, but over time it seems to have dissipated and morphed into a more personal protection of Pinochet. Evidence for this change is demonstrated in the fact that every instance of protesting coincided with restarting or pushing indictments against Pinochet or his family.<sup>68</sup> When Pinochet was deemed mentally unfit to stand trial, thereby ending the attempts to

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<sup>65</sup> Hunter, “Continuity or Change?” 456–7.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 457.

<sup>67</sup> “Las Frases para el Bronce de Pinochet,” *La Nación*, December 11, 2006, [http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus\\_noticias/site/artic/20061210/pags/20061210221221.html](http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias/site/artic/20061210/pags/20061210221221.html).

<sup>68</sup> Fuentes, “After Pinochet,” 135.

prosecute him, relations between the military and the government improved noticeable, though this breakthrough did not occur until the middle of 2001.<sup>69</sup>

President Aylwin, newly elected and attempting to consolidate civilian control of the military, had many obstacles to overcome to accomplish his goals. First was the institutional power that the military maintained after the transition. This power was vested in the service chiefs and in the military training and judicial systems. The individual filling a particular role, however, had plenty of leeway in determining how to use that power and the types of relationships it would have with civilian superiors. While Pinochet remained the Army Chief of Staff, he refused to participate in events or formalities that acknowledged the position of Minister of Defense as anything other than administrative. He also did not attend Aylwin's annual address to congress in an effort to demonstrate institutional autonomy.<sup>70</sup>

It can be said that the military was seen as a monolithic entity that would resist advances in civilian authority at every turn. This, however, does not seem to have been the view that Aylwin and his administration took when working with Pinochet and his colleagues. While a very powerful individual, Pinochet was only one of four service chiefs when you include the Carabineros. In many cases, the administration was able to create informal relationships with leaders in the military which were able to diffuse the conflicts that arose. These relationships were informal because, while the military still maintained a significant amount of institutional autonomy, the Aylwin administration was very forceful in using those aspects of the constitution that gave it power over the military. The military pushed back against the forced subordination just as the administration fought any legal aspects that allowed the military to operate without civilian oversight.

The main area of pushback, which routinely reared its head, was any attack against the legacy of Pinochet. Since he had run the country and was then the army Chief of Staff, he was seen as the face of the military, and as such, the fate of his legacy was

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<sup>69</sup> Silva, "Searching for Civilian Supremacy," 390.

<sup>70</sup> Fuentes, "After Pinochet," 122.

perceived to indicate the fate of the military's legacy. This idea of legacy protection turned personal inquiries into Pinochet and his family into attacks on the military institution, which Pinochet defended through barely-veiled threats in the event that any of his personnel were indicted.<sup>71</sup> Had this been mere talk it would have been easy to dismiss and continue to consolidate the national democracy. There were, however, several times when the military did act to show its displeasure, though it never carried out an attempt to regain political power.<sup>72</sup> Even amid these demonstrations of power, there were individuals within the military that the administration could turn to in order to negotiate and de-escalate.

After eighteen years of military dictatorship, the Chilean military was entrenched in political society as an autonomous organization that saw itself as guarantors of Chilean government and progress.<sup>73</sup> The depth of this fundamental role as the protector of Chilean society and honor was not truly understood by the leftist coalition, nor even fully by the right-wing parties typically supportive of the military. There was a very large gap between the military and the civilian population that could not be bridged by simple regime change and civilian rule. It is easy to understand how this gap was created, especially given that civilians were not allowed to participate or direct in any military training, logistics or acquisition policies.<sup>74</sup> The Aylwin administration's goal was not only to increase civilian control of the military but to make use of that control whenever possible and create a precedent. Only through repetition and practice could civilian control be institutionalized while waiting for the legal framework to follow. This policy was met with substantial pushback from the military because if the military was fully controlled by civilians, they could not step in to guide the government's policies.

While Aylwin seemingly missed the why behind the military's actions, he showed a good understanding of the what. He did not miss the cues from the military that they did not want to cede power and prestige, though many likely misunderstood it to be simple

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<sup>71</sup> Fuentes, "After Pinochet," 135.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 129, 135, and Silva, "Searching for Civilian Supremacy," 383.

<sup>73</sup> Silva, "Searching for Civilian Supremacy," 379.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 380.

power politics. To those generals who had dedicated their entire lives to the nation, it was a personal attack. To Aylwin and the leftist coalition that had suffered under Pinochet's rule for almost two decades, it was an attempt to prevent the military from being able to stage a coup or influence national politics anymore.

### **3. Where the Civilians Went Right**

Politicization of the military in Chile was a new-found hobby and Pinochet was still around for the first eight years to ensure that the armed forces had ways to influence the government. President Aylwin and the Concertación coalition understood this and tried to find ways to exert control over the military without antagonizing them too much. An example of this is keeping the constitution of 1980 even though it was created by a military regime to propagate its own rule and was ratified through a questionable plebiscite. Also, rather than simply dispensing with the Organic Law of the Armed Forces of 1989, the coalition sat down with the regime and the right-wing parties to negotiate a settlement that was more favorable to a civilian, elected government. It was through understanding both the strong position of the military throughout the transition and the noticeable hope that the coalition would fail and return power to Pinochet that the elected government was able to work through the stringent legal requirements to slowly start transferring power from holdout areas to the civilian administration.

## **B. ARGENTINA**

Argentina's past has been much more praetorian than Chile's. While Chile's military started to see itself as the guarantor of the state during the Pinochet regime, Argentina's military has seen itself in this light since at least the early twentieth century. Between 1930 and the end of Alfonsín's term in 1989, no elected president had peacefully handed power to another elected president from a different party.<sup>75</sup> Anytime there had been political turmoil, economic failure, or civil unrest, the military had stepped in and taken over. This occurred five times with subsequent military presidents and once with a civilian puppet in the fifty-three years leading up to Argentina's latest

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<sup>75</sup> Deborah L. Norden, "Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism: Argentina in the 1980s," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 32, no. 3 (1990): 152, JSTOR (166091).



democratization. With this track record of extreme politicization, it is no wonder the Radical Party under Alfonsín saw the military as a potential threat.

The military regime in power from 1976–1983 called itself the *Proceso de Reorganización Nacional* (Proceso), and came to power when the government of Isabel Peron was in a disastrous mess and armed guerillas were causing problems in some rural areas. There were several guerilla movements, both left and right-leaning, and their armed aggression convinced the military that they needed to step in and fix the situation. This was a continuation of the mandate given to the military by President Isabel Martinez de Peron to annihilate subversion in the country.<sup>76</sup> Since the late 1960s, the Argentine military had been operating under the concept that taking military control of the government was a required step to achieve modernization and nation-building.<sup>77</sup> When the military chiefs of staff saw the need for pacification and elimination of subversive ideologies on top of the political and economic turmoil of the day, it is no surprise that no one even wanted to oppose the coup in 1976.<sup>78</sup> These goals of ideological cleansing were mainly targeted at Marxists and communists, though as time went on it was not long before almost anyone was a target.

After seven years in power, the Proceso regime had utterly failed to curb hyperinflation and had amassed a foreign debt of \$43 billion.<sup>79</sup> If anything, economic conditions were worse than before and the regime was failing even by its own standards.<sup>80</sup> Politically, the regime had long since run out of legitimacy. In only seven years, around 9,000 people had been murdered and a total of up to 30,000 people had

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<sup>76</sup> Norden, “Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism,” 170.

<sup>77</sup> Paul W. Zagorski, “Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy: The Armed Forces Under the Menem Government,” *Armed Forces & Society* 20, no. 3 (1994): 424, Sage, <http://journals.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/0095327x9402000306>.

<sup>78</sup> Norden, “Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism,” 162 and Wendy Hunter, “The Dirty War and Its Aftermath: Recent Contributions on the Military and Politics in Argentina,” *Latin American Research Review* 34, no. 2 (1999): 208, JSTOR (2503918).

<sup>79</sup> Marcelo Cavarozzi, “Patterns of Elite Negotiation and Confrontation in Argentina and Chile,” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, ed. John Higley and Richard Gunther (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 228.

<sup>80</sup> David Pion-Berlin, “Between Confrontation and Accommodation: Military and Government Policy in Democratic Argentina,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 23, no. 3 (1991): 550, JSTOR (157384).

been disappeared.<sup>81</sup> All this to ensure that there was peace and stability. Positions that were normally elected officials going down to the provincial level were run by military officers and there were interrogation centers spread around the country. These failures by themselves could have allowed the regime to survive for a little while longer, but the final straw was the abysmal performance by the military leadership in their execution of the Islas Malvinas War. It was not that the war was waged to begin with that hurt their standing, most Argentines agreed that the islands should belong to Argentina, it was the utter failure to properly plan, coordinate between the services, and anticipate reactions that removed any vestiges of legitimacy either as a political entity or as military leadership from the Proceso regime.<sup>82</sup> This loss of face was ultimately what led the regime to call for elections within the year and withdrew to their barracks.

In 1983, the military handed the reins back to civilians. The experiences of the previous seven years in power had changed the mentality of the military, especially since they had performed so terribly in their acquired positions. The incoming administration under president Alfonsín did not understand this change and instead focused solely on the history of the military to estimate what it could expect from the military going forward. If history held true, Alfonsín did not have much time to defang the military and show progress in other areas as well before the military would come knocking at the door of the Casa Rosada. The actions taken and the reforms enacted by the Alfonsín government demonstrated a fear and loathing of the military as an institution regarding their influence and power in national politics. It seems clear that the government saw the military's goal as protecting the country from bad governance and political instability and that if the government did not take the requisite steps to prevent it, the military would take over again in short order.

This hyper-politicized version of the military does not seem to have survived the turnover, however, as the failures of the Proceso regime convinced the military of the dangers of over-diversification of its personnel. The military saw its new mission as re-professionalization in the sense that it needed to regain its operational proficiency and go

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<sup>81</sup> Hunter, "The Dirty War and Its Aftermath," 199.

<sup>82</sup> Norden, "Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism," 159.

back to the basics of being good military officers, rather than fix the politicians' problems every time they messed up.<sup>83</sup>

### **1. The Civilians' Lens**

The incoming civilian government was of the opinion that the military had been oppressive, incompetent, and had trampled on people's right on a daily basis. If civil society was to recover from the horrors of the previous seven years, then there had to be consequences for the actions the military had taken. Alfonsín was no stranger to this concept before becoming president and did not seem to change his mind once in office. He knew that there was a difference between the institution of the military and the individuals that had committed the atrocities, and he tried to convince the military of this, but he also had an agenda for each. He wanted to punish those responsible and enact significant reforms on the institution that would reorganize it to make it more efficient and more in line with a consolidated democracy with civilian supremacy.

The Radical party had made some significant promises during the short, but heated, election campaign in 1983. First, the party platform claimed it would reduce the military budget to ensure it was never over 2% of the GNP.<sup>84</sup> While this budget cut was not enacted to the extent promised, the budget was significantly reduced to the point where officers were reporting not having enough ammunition to train or fuel to fly required proficiency hours in their aircraft.<sup>85</sup> Considering the economic shambles the country was in, these cuts are not surprising, but to the military, it was seen as an attack on the institution. Second, the Radical party claimed it would prosecute all crimes committed under the Proceso regime in the jurisdiction responsible for each case. This included having the military crimes tried in military courts. While this was the case initially, the intentional delays in the military courts forced the government to move them

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<sup>83</sup> Zagorski, "Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy," 426, 434.

<sup>84</sup> Norden, "Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism," 165.

<sup>85</sup> Pion-Berlin, "Between Confrontation and Accommodation," 557, and Norden, "Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism," 165.

to federal civilian courts.<sup>86</sup> As the military saw their actions as protecting the nation and following the orders of the elected government before them, military courts were not willing to try personnel for actions that were not seen as being illegal.

## **2. Policy Constraints and Military Pushback**

After the total failure of the military regime which essentially returned to its barracks with its tail between its legs, Alfonsín and his Radical party did not fear any military reprisals for policy changes and reforms in the short term; the military's failure had granted a short grace period for them to operate in. Several years down the road, if changes were not made to improve the situation, maybe the military would step back in, but not when the new government had such a strong backing and the military was despised. The political capital that Alfonsín had was tremendous, but he did not understand how quickly he could lose it.

While there were no attempts to take over the government during Alfonsín's six years in office, there were three military insurrections. These insurrections were surprising in that even though much of what created the situation allowing mid-level officers to feel the freedom to commit these acts of rebellion was politicization of the military, the demands they made were military in nature and they did not commit the insurrections in political locations.<sup>87</sup> The demands would fall under the traditional definition of concerns of professionalism similar to Huntington's objective control definition.<sup>88</sup> After Alfonsín relinquished power to his elected successor, Carlos Menem, there was one insurrection that was put down harshly by the rest of the military after the plotters killed a fellow officer.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Pion-Berlin, "Between Confrontation and Accommodation," 560, and Norden, "Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism," 166.

<sup>87</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Asserting Civilian Control: Argentina," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 153.

<sup>88</sup> Norden, "Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism," 156–7.

<sup>89</sup> Zagorski, "Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy," 432.

The reason for much of the peaceful military pushback was the central issue of human rights abuse trials. While much of the military agreed with punishing those who issued the orders, public outcry and human rights organizations pushed for more and more individuals to be prosecuted to the point where the military started to feel an existential threat. On top of the judicial mission creep, the trials were being delayed and with so many people being indicted, there was no end in sight for the military. To the armed forces, who already were suffering from devastated prestige and scorn from all sectors of society, this prolongation of the trials and constant reminders of failure galvanized them and actually started to re-politicize the officer corps.<sup>90</sup> With the eviscerated defense budget, many soldiers, officer and enlisted, could no longer live on the meager salary they received from the military. Many were forced to find a second job and some even had to resign to find another job entirely. Add to all of this the removal of authority from the service chiefs as commanders and subordinating them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was in turn subordinated to the Defense Minister, it seemed to the military that there would not be much left of them once Alfonsín was done. It was this combination of effects, which the civilians did not identify, that led to the insurrectionist movements. The administration was blind to these sentiments, however, because their only connection to the military was through the Defense Ministry which dealt with the Flag and General Officers, not through any connection with the disenfranchised mid-rank officers who were feeling attacked from all sides.

### **3. Where the Civilians Went Wrong**

After the fall of the Proceso regime, the military lost its appetite for politics and saw a new goal in re-professionalizing itself into an effective military with the expertise and training that it had lost over the years of political diversification. This would require a budget to accomplish but would also require restructuring. It also required having enough members of the armed forces left to fill the ranks. This set of goals was completely missed by the Alfonsín government. The government wanted to punish the officers responsible for giving the orders to commit such atrocious acts as were seen

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<sup>90</sup> Pion-Berlin, "Between Confrontation and Accommodation," 562.

during the Dirty War, but not every single individual that had been forced to participate by their superiors. By staying hands off and letting the judicial proceedings handle the cases, Alfonsín lost control of the situation and did not take steps to limit the number of people prosecuted until enough damage had been done to cause the first insurrection.<sup>91</sup> In this, the government failed to understand the general population as well. Alfonsín also wanted to slash the military budget in order to minimize the military's ability to influence politics in the future, but also due to strict economic recovery policies. Unfortunately, budgets were cut but the military was not restructured to match the new budget, leaving people with no salary and no useable equipment. This specifically went against the military's legitimate goal of re-professionalization on all fronts and caused some to band together to force concessions from the government. While Alfonsín tried to separate the trials of the guilty individuals from the reforms of the institution, many in the military did not see the distinction.<sup>92</sup> Alfonsín did not recognize their differing viewpoint and as such did not take any steps to coopt the military into getting onboard with his goals.

### C. CONCLUSION

Both Chile and Argentina successfully transitioned from military dictatorships to democracy at the end of the twentieth century. Since then, the historical precedent of military intervention in politics has been just that, history. These experiences were not the same and the successes of each transitional administration certainly were not the same either. In Chile, the Aylwin government understood the need to work with the military and was not blind to the fact that the military still had political aspirations should the civilians mess things up again. Too strong of a push against military institutional prerogatives or threaten the regime's legacy and the military just might take back the government. Argentina was very different. The military suffered such a professional failure that it wanted to withdraw and leave the politics to the politicians. The armed forces wanted to focus on being the defensive shield for the nation in armed combat, something they realized they had lost sight of. This change in mentality was not noticed

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<sup>91</sup> Pion-Berlin, "Between Confrontation and Accommodation," 562–3.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 561–2.

by the Alfonsín administration, whether intentionally or not is unclear. What is known is that Alfonsín's government pushed the military down from so many angles that it started to fragment and push back. The political capital seen in 1983 was quickly exhausted by multi-faceted attacks on military influence. While Argentina continues as a democracy and did not see a coup even during the extreme financial and economic crisis of 2000, the credit for that lies more in the military's desire to re-professionalize itself into a more capable military than it does in the politicians understanding their perceived opposition's perspective.

The next chapter explores the reforms in Chile born out of the military and civilian understandings of each other. While this chapter explained the starting points for the process, the next chapter will explain the path taken to arrive at the civil-military relations and effectiveness conditions that Chile is currently in.

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### **III. CHILE AND THE LONG, SLOW MARCH TO REFORM**

The last chapter covered incentives, preconceptions, and understandings of rivals that established the beginning of Chile's return to democracy. Now that a foundation has been built, this chapter will analyze the decisions taken by the politicians and officers who held these beliefs, some to defend their positions and others to build upon the democracy they had just regained. Included in the analysis is not only what reforms were taken but how effectiveness was impacted in each time period.

For over a century, Chile has consistently been at the front of the pack in demonstrating a stable democracy. Over the past twenty-seven years since its return to democracy, civilians have taken several strides to strengthen their control over the armed forces and those reforms have been accepted by the military. Each decade presented a new environment for legislators to work in, with differing amounts of success to show for it. Coupled with each reform is its impact on the military's subsequent effectiveness. While initially difficult to produce any political changes, legislators and politicians gained momentum over the years in implementing changes to the defense institution. Similarly, as these changes were implemented, the military was still able to further its agenda of modernization by virtue of maintaining control of every organization's lifeblood: its funding.

This chapter will discuss the missions designated for the military and then look at each time period individually, first identifying the reforms that took place during that period and then analyzing any noticeable changes in effectiveness. I argue that while change was slow in Chile due to the continued presence of Augusto Pinochet in a position of power, the government made what changes it could. While not antagonistic in nature toward the military, these reforms started to shift power and control from the armed forces to the civilian government. The slow nature of change, along with the persisting Copper Law allowed the military to have sufficient money to periodically modernize the force and conduct training, both nationally and internationally.

## **A. STATED MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES**

Each nation has the sovereign right and duty to determine the conditions under which its armed forces should be used. These conditions create the need for the armed forces to undertake specific missions that they alone are in a position to accomplish as the coercive arm of the government. These missions could be determined by historical precedent, conflicts with neighboring states, territorial disputes, internal instability, political influence of key stakeholders, or constitutional concerns to name a few. In 2002, Chile chose to identify three main missions for its armed forces: national defense, national security, and guarantee the institutional order of the country.<sup>93</sup> These missions are primarily carried out through deterrence, though the use of force is also relied on as a viable option. In the 2010 version of the document, these three items were modified to protecting national sovereignty, preservation of national territory, and protection of the national populace. These new line items are further described as the ability to field sufficient numbers of trained forces, preference for the use of deterrence or dissuasion to accomplish desired outcomes, and strengthening Chile's participation in international peace and stability missions around the world.<sup>94</sup> These missions are vague and leave much open to interpretation, though in summary they can be stated as having an effective military force able to deter potential belligerents and perform United Nations peacekeeping missions worldwide.

## **B. 1990-2000**

The 1990s was a time of transition in Chile, and while the country tried to remember what it felt like to be a democracy again, many political exiles returned home. The military had handed power to the civilians, but they had not disappeared from society.

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<sup>93</sup> Ministry of National Defense of Chile, *Book of the National Defense of Chile: 2002* (Santiago: Ministry of National Defense of Chile, 2003), 96.

<sup>94</sup> Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile, *Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile: 2010* (Santiago: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile, 2010), 168.

## 1. The First Decade

After the return to democracy in Chile, tensions with the military remained high. While the Presidency and cabinet positions were now filled by civilians, the binomial electoral system and designated senatorial seats appointed by Pinochet prior to the transition prevented the left-leaning Concertación Coalition from making any defense related reforms that limited the military's view of its missions and authorities. This is not to say that attempts were not made at various points. During the dictatorship, the *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional* (DINA) was the secret police and intelligence agency responsible for the majority of the repressive acts against the population in the first years of Pinochet's rule.<sup>95</sup> This role was taken over by the *Central Nacional de Informaciones* (CNI) in 1977 when DINA was disbanded, and survived until the eve of the transition to civilian rule. While these secret intelligence organizations were dissolved, the military retained its own intelligence organizations, which remained unfettered and unreformed. While the Concertación government frequently discussed intelligence reform in their policy platforms, they did not push it hard. This, along with sufficient military supporters in the legislature, ensured that even a proposal from the President failed to make it out of the committee stage.<sup>96</sup>

Struggling with intelligence reforms is one example of the difficulty faced by the new government in its efforts to increase civilian control of the military, though it was not the last. With General Pinochet still serving as the Army Chief of Staff, whom the constitution did not allow the President to fire, the gap between the military and society did not start to shrink until after Pinochet retired from the army in 1998 and the Army started taking responsibility for its actions under the dictatorship.<sup>97</sup> Many of the general and flag officers had been promoted and supported by Pinochet, which left them in the position of defending him until he was out of the picture. The Army was especially in this

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<sup>95</sup> Gregory Weeks, "The Military and Intelligence Reform in Chile," *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad* 18, no. 3 (2004): 258, ProQuest (236126424).

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 259.

<sup>97</sup> Juan C. Salgado Brocal, "Chile: Transition Toward the Subordination of the Military," in *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, ed. Dennis C. Blair (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 73–74.

predicament as Pinochet was still the service chief. In 1998, when Pinochet retired from active duty, he became a Senator for life, giving even more strength to the right-wing block of military supporters in the legislature. While this ended when Interpol arrested him and extradited him to London, he still enjoyed strong support from the opposition groups until deemed unfit to stand trial due to declining mental faculties.<sup>98</sup>

Efforts were made to remove the Carabineros and investigative police from the Ministry of National Defense and place them under the Ministry of the Interior, but these efforts failed all throughout the 1990s due to right-wing political support for the military.<sup>99</sup> To this day, the Carabineros are still under the Ministry of National Defense.

## **2. Military Effectiveness**

As there were no reforms enacted during this time period, it provides a good baseline for comparing changes in military capabilities and effectiveness. Due to constitutional and other legal provisions, the budget for the armed forces was kept at a level no lower than that provided in the 1989 budget. They were also given 10% of the proceeds from the state-owned copper industry to spend on acquisitions with a minimum value as stipulated by the Copper Law.<sup>100</sup>

Defense expenditures accounted for approximately 4% of Chile's GDP but even that amount was not enough money to sustain the 1990 personnel levels while updating platforms. Whereas in 1990 Chile had 102,000 personnel in reserves across all three services, by 2000, that number had dropped to 50,000, and those only in the army. The time of service for the active conscripts dropped from two years for all services to one

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<sup>98</sup> Gregory Weeks, "The 'Lessons' of Dictatorship: Political Learning and the Military in Chile," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 21, no. 3 (2002): 410, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/1470-9856.00050/asset/1470-9856.00050.pdf;jsessionid=995DDCE555BDEA534A86DB449C5BDE2A.f02t03?v=1&t=izxrf8oh&s=b57f033e1e0a72ca1cda91b917067e26eedbd10c>.

<sup>99</sup> Michael Radseck, "From Casa Militar to an Instrument of Political Control: A Functional Analysis of the Defense Ministries in Argentina and Chile," *Defense and Security Analysis* 21, no. 2 (2005): 185, ProQuest (225067962).

<sup>100</sup> Brocal, "Chile: Transition Toward the Subordination of the Military," 77.

year for the army and 22 months for the navy and air force. Even the career military population dropped by 8,600 in the 1990s.<sup>101</sup>

This reduction in personnel saved on costs but also allowed the army to become a leaner organization. Chile decided to eliminate its medium tank capability in favor of a more robust, modernized main battle tank inventory. The army finished retiring its Sherman and Super Sherman tanks upon delivery of 200 Leopard I tanks from the Netherlands in 2000. Chile's armored personnel carrier numbers were increased though no new platforms were acquired. The army acquired two new transport aircraft platforms but maintained all the previous ones. Even with increased capabilities from the greater number of aircraft, that Chile kept so many types of aircraft adds complexity and cost to the maintenance efforts of the ground crews. The army purchased eight Cessna R-182 aircraft for pilot training in 1999 but they only saw service for two years, bringing into question the effectiveness of their planning and acquisitions processes.<sup>102</sup>

The navy did not fare as well as the army in the 1990s. Personnel numbers dropped by over 17%, one submarine and Chile's only cruiser were decommissioned along with six destroyers and an oiler. One of their French *Batral* class troop transports was decommissioned and replaced by a second-hand U.S. *Newport* class ship, and they acquired one additional second-hand frigate. These changes left Chile with only five main surface combatants, even though they more than doubled their coastal fleet of small missile boats and patrol craft. Naval aviation updated its maritime surveillance aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters to newer platforms, but the amount of flight hours and training opportunities is not clear. The marines were gutted almost by 50% in personnel while still maintaining the same number of battalions. A new capability of light tanks was also added to the inventory with 30 Scorpion tanks. With so few personnel and increasing

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<sup>101</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990–1991* (London: Brassey's, 1990), 189 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000–2001* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), 233.

<sup>102</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990–1991*, 189 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000–2001*, 233.

equipment, it is questionable how much capability was actually gained in the initial years after the Scorpion purchase.<sup>103</sup>

While Chile's air force personnel numbers dropped slightly during the 1990s, the number of conscripts almost doubled. The air force made large strides in modernizing their inventory by retiring old fighters and replacing them with Mirage jets, many of them new, as well as large increases in transport aircraft and helicopters. Training platforms diminished significantly, as old aircraft were retired and replaced by fewer newer trainers. As with naval aviation, the sheer number of different airframes, with only a few of each kind of aircraft, complicates maintenance and increases the life-cycle costs. In 2000, Chile's air force had nine different airframes for a total of only forty planes.<sup>104</sup>

It is unclear how many local exercises the military has undertaken on a regular basis during the 1990s but there have been a few multi-national exercises that Chile has participated in regularly including RIMPAC since 1994, Team Work South since 1995, Maritime Combined Operations Training since 1995, Team Work North since 1996, and UNITAS as well as several bilateral training exercises designed to increase cooperation with regional partners.<sup>105</sup> While these are great for international engagement, they are mostly scripted and do not typically involve significant free play portions.

In summary, by 2000, Chile's military power had substantially changed. By shedding its internal security mission, all branches of the military were able to focus on building the forces that they could put to use in accomplishing their respective missions. By trimming down on personnel, the various branches were able to afford some new platforms, though not enough to totally eliminate the equipment that was nearing obsolescence. With a primary mission of defense through deterrence, Chile's order of battle was substantial enough to be formidable when compared to its neighbors, even considering the down-sizing. Chile's involvement in international peacekeeping

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<sup>103</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990–1991*, 189–90 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000–2001*, 233–4.

<sup>104</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990–1991*, 190 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000–2001*, 234.

<sup>105</sup> The International Vector, Armada de Chile, accessed February 24, 2017, <http://www.armada.cl/armada/chilean-navy/the-international-vector/2014-05-26/111929.html>.

operations increased over the decade to include East Timor, thereby advancing Chile's peacekeeping mission area. Chile's military effectiveness is thus graded as moderate since, while strong enough to defend its borders should anything occur, readiness is in question and the down-sizing in some major capability areas was significant.

While the political elites did not put any legal reforms through the legislature, they were still involved in acquisition decisions and force size decisions. These decisions kept the military focused on their assigned roles, but likely would have been greater in scope had Pinochet not still been a prominent military and political figure.

### **C. 2000-2010**

The new millennium ushered in an opportunity for change in the civil-military relations landscape. It was not smooth sailing, but the pre-Pinochet democracy started to reappear.

#### **1. Making Progress**

Once Pinochet was out of the political picture, it still took time to get the right-wing legislators to join hands with the Concertación coalition which continued to control La Moneda throughout a second decade. This progress began once the social chasm started to close after the *Mesa de Diálogo* and after the military accepted limited responsibility for the atrocities committed under the Pinochet regime.<sup>106</sup> Many of the generals and admirals that Pinochet had placed in power had by then retired and the antagonism toward reform began to dwindle. In 2003, the comptroller general reinterpreted the Copper Law and by 2005, enough support had been garnered to pass changes to the constitution which included reforms to the military's autonomy and shifted significant powers back into the hands of civilians.

The Copper Law in Chile is considered a reserved law, and as such is not available for general viewing. Its reserved nature notwithstanding, many scholars have written about

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<sup>106</sup> Maria Julia Moreyra, preface to *Defense Policy in Latin America*, ed. Maria Julia Moreyra (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011), iv and Juan Emilio Cheyre, "Characteristics of and Influences on the Armed Forces During Democratic Transition in Latin America," in *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, ed. Dennis C. Blair (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2013), 32.

the portions that have been made public through comments and references by officials. In the final months of 2003, the comptroller general decided to propose a discretionary reinterpretation to the controversial law, which was approved in 2004. Previously, 10% of the profits from the state-owned copper industry, CODELCO, was given to the armed forces annually for acquisition purchases. This income stream also had a guaranteed minimum, which if the funds from CODELCO did not meet, the national treasury was responsible to make up the difference.<sup>107</sup> Under the new interpretation, funds in excess of the guaranteed minimum were put aside and remained under the control of the Ministry of Economy, even though it was still earmarked for military acquisition purchases. The guaranteed amount was split evenly among the three services with at least 5% designated for joint operations.<sup>108</sup> To date, the Copper Law has not been repealed, however this reinterpretation of the execution of the law is the closest legislators have been able to get. Through it, civilians have been able to recover some control over the economic and budgetary power that the armed forces wielded for decades.

In September 2005, a new constitutional law was passed that amended the Chilean constitution in several important defense-related ways. First, it eliminated the appointed senatorial seats that had previously been the military's way to influence the legislature. Second, the new law abolished the concept of senator for life put in place by Pinochet, which left the senate with only popularly elected officials in its ranks. Third, the amended constitution now allows the president to remove sitting Chiefs of Staff as necessary, thereby returning much of the military's political power to the civilian elected defense officials. Lastly, the National Security Council ceased to be a decision-making body, and was relegated to a purely advisory role to be convened at the president's request.<sup>109</sup> For one signature, these four changes are substantial in consolidating democracy and enforcing civilian control of the military. Prior to this reform, military Chiefs of Staff had substantial

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<sup>107</sup> Armen Kouyoumdjian, "The Military in Chile: The Long Road Towards Civil-Military Integration," in *Defense Policy in Latin America*, ed. Maria Julia Moreyra (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011), 33.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>109</sup> "President Lagos Signs New Constitution for Chile," *U.S. Fed News Service*, September 17, 2005, ProQuest (472069404).



power to follow their own agendas. If they did not agree with or like the President's directions, they could theoretically ignore him without fear of being removed. This was how Pinochet was allowed to stay the Army Chief of Staff for eight years after the end of his dictatorship. By eliminating the non-elected senatorial seats, the military no longer had a strong enough voting block to be assured of preventing future reforms. With the National Security Council unable to force or prevent national policy that it viewed as relating to national security, the military's only method of influencing defense policy and legal decrees was through recommendations and military expertise as requested by the president. These changes strongly shifted the balance of power toward the civilian end of the spectrum and substantially increased civilian control of the military.

Three years later, in December of 2008, the Chilean government passed a new law to amend the Organic Law of the Armed Forces from 1989. This new law, N° 20303, changed the conscription program for the armed forces in an effort to professionalize it.<sup>110</sup> The law gave several increased benefits to the conscripts and allowed for a more voluntary service, rather than forced service. It was part of an initiative started in 2005 by President Bachelet and ultimately changed the structure of the military. With this law in place, the phasing out of conscript service began, though it wasn't completed until 2014.<sup>111</sup> In the meantime, recruitment efforts were increased and while all 18 year olds were still required to register for the draft, forced conscription was only used to fill personnel gaps remaining after recruiting was completed.<sup>112</sup>

While not necessarily designed to increase civilian control of the military, military leaders were not convinced that eliminating conscription was in their best interest. Militaries have always tied themselves to the history of the nation in Latin America and by removing conscription, society no longer had a strong tie to the military and the military in turn would not be able to shape cultural values to the same extent as before. This concern

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<sup>110</sup> Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, "Resúmenes de Leyes," accessed February 25, 2017, <https://www.leychile.cl/Consulta/ResumenNorma?idNorma=282648&idParte=&fechaVigencia=2008-12-04>.

<sup>111</sup> Chile – Personnel, Global Security, last modified November 27, 2012, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/chile/personnel.htm>.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

shows a highly-politicized military that has vested interests in the shaping of society and political culture, not just the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity as dictated by national policy. Successfully implementing this reform was expected to lead to a more effective military since the level of training would be higher and all members would have a vested interest in the success of their operations. This seems as though it should always be the case for the military, but in a region with almost no state-level armed conflict, most of those operations are not typically life-threatening for the service member. Conscripts can wait out their obligation time and in the army, where service time was only one year, that was not a long wait. If the top military leaders were correct in their concerns over losing input into the shaping of society, eliminating conscription would have the added benefit of shifting power back into the hands of civilians.

## **2. Military Effectiveness**

Overall, the military significantly modernized during this time period, even though their numbers decreased in many areas. The military budget continued to be controlled by the same legal framework as in previous years, removing much of the legislature's power to control funding to the armed forces. Copper prices increased during this decade but so did the Chilean economy as a whole, so although military spending increased, it did not increase as a percentage of GDP. Even with the reinterpretation of the Copper Law, the Chilean congress saw the wisdom of fielding a capable military, and as such, did not limit their ability to purchase new platforms, though the Ministry of National Defense continued to provide oversight and ensure that money was not wasted on new platforms when second-hand platforms would provide the needed capability.

In the army, numbers fell dramatically, though career forces were only reduced by 2000; the other 14,000 personnel decrease came from the diminishing use of conscripts. These personnel changes are all the more drastic when it becomes clear that Chile's army consisted of only 35,000 personnel including conscripts in 2010. Chile upgraded its tank inventory to consist of Leopard I and II tanks and eliminated its aging AMX-30 main battle tanks. While army aircraft numbers were diminished in all categories, obsolete airframes were retired and new ones acquired to maintain capabilities with fewer aircraft. The army

significantly improved its artillery capabilities in both numbers of artillery pieces and modernization.<sup>113</sup>

While the navy lost almost a third of its personnel between 2001–2010, it was able to add two new submarines and completely refresh its frigate force of three obsolete ships with eight second-hand ships with much greater capabilities. Chile retired its only two destroyers but otherwise increased its capability to project power at sea. Naval aviation also saw a large increase in platforms as it both modernized and grew substantially with new fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. The marines were not the focus of modernization, however, and retired half of their tank inventory and almost half of their armored personnel carriers. These are the same tanks that the marines had just purchased in the 1990s, so it is unclear if it was a cost or maintenance based decision.<sup>114</sup>

The air force went through a substantial change in mentality and platforms, as evidenced by how their forces were reported. Previously distinguishing between fighter/ground attack, fighter/reconnaissance, and counterinsurgency, by 2010 they were all lumped into the fighter/ground attack category. Chile replaced their Mirage inventory with F-16s purchased from the U.S. but still held on to some legacy platforms, likely to get more use out of the aircraft they had only purchased approximately a decade before. While the number of helicopters decreased, they were able to purchase newer, more capable, platforms. Still uncertain is whether the air force gained capabilities in air transport, as they not only increased the number of aircraft available to them but also the number of different airframes being used, adding to an already significant maintenance requirement.<sup>115</sup>

When looking at the reforms during this decade, neither defense budget, nor acquisitions, nor modernization changed their trajectories after civilians regained

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<sup>113</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000–2001*, 233 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010* (Philadelphia: Routledge, 2010), 72–3.

<sup>114</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000–2001*, 233–4 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010*, 73.

<sup>115</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000–2001*, 234 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010*, 74.

significant power at the national level. Part of the reason for not changing the budget is that the legislature had very little influence on the budget to begin with, but they also saw the benefit of having a modern force that could properly defend the nation. Chile created a Peacekeeping Training Facility in 2002 in order to better prepare their forces to deploy overseas in capacities other than stereotypical combat roles. This school served, and continues to serve, not only as a training site for Chilean forces, but many other interested forces from across the region. Peacekeeping operations increased dramatically in 2004 and has been sustained at a high level ever since, as shown in Figure 1. The military needed the equipment to operate in a foreign country and the logistics to support the troops. Both of these require significant amounts of money and expertise to accomplish, and a weak military with a slashed budget would not be able to carry out Chile's national objectives in the international arena. This is not to say that there were no budget constraints. Several acquisition plans were delayed as rising personnel and pension costs ate into funding.<sup>116</sup> Militaries across the region struggled with economic downturns during various times and transfer of technology concerns delayed the delivery of Chile's F-16s for five years. Amid these financial concerns, Chile not only created the peacekeeping school but also created a combined peacekeeping force called *Cruz del Sur* with Argentina in 2008 to increase confidence between the two nations and improve the ability to send troops on United Nations missions.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2001–2002* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), 216 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2002–2003* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 169.

<sup>117</sup> "Chile and Argentina Launch Cruz del Sur Joint Peace Force," MercoPress, April 5, 2008, <http://en.mercopress.com/2008/04/05/chile-and-argentina-launch-cruz-del-sur-joint-peace-force>.




Figure 1. Chilean Uniformed Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–2016<sup>118</sup>

The decision to eliminate conscription had more obvious effects though the impact of those effects was less obvious as the program was just getting started. The troop reductions over the entire decade cannot be attributed solely to the 2008 reform. Conscription numbers dropped substantially more between 2000–2008 than they did between 2008–2010.<sup>119</sup> Regardless of how or when they reduced troop numbers, by the end of the decade, Chile’s military was much leaner and had more funding freed up to afford maintenance and future modernization plans. The limit on military input into society did not seem to be as large of an issue either as they were continuously reaching their accession requirements through volunteers.<sup>120</sup>

<sup>118</sup> Source: Kristina Mani and Alejandro Amigo, Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Chile, Providing for Peacekeeping, last modified February 2017, <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-chile>.

<sup>119</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000–2001*, 233–4, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2008* (Philadelphia: Routledge, 2008), 71–3 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010*, 72–4.

<sup>120</sup> Latin American Security and Defense Network, *A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean: 2014 Edition* (Buenos Aires: RESDAL, 2014), 164.

Overall, Chile continued to modernize, improve, and trim the fat on a military that was now focused on protecting its own territory and sovereignty through regional stability and peacekeeping operations. While some obsolete platforms remained, many had been retired and replaced. Personnel costs were curtailed by eliminating conscription which not only diminished costs but improved the average quality of the personnel remaining. Chile created a peacekeeping training center with the specific goal of providing tailored training to the units and troops that would be deployed in support of the United Nations around the world. The reform in 2005 adjusted the power base of the military but that did not end up being detrimental to the military or its objectives. The professionalization reform of 2008 was just starting to kick in with personnel cuts, but the effects of this were beneficial to the quality of the military and was not a new phenomenon, as conscription numbers had been decreasing since 2001. Chile's military effectiveness is graded as moderate/high as they have the capabilities to pursue their national objectives, but their retention of several obsolete platforms beyond the point of necessity reduces their capabilities in some areas and adds unnecessary burdens on the operations and maintenance budget that is already tight due to high personnel and pension costs.

The shifts made toward civilian control of the military were important but they did not add a substantial financial burden on the military. If anything, the troop reductions and retirement of obsolete platforms helped control the budget in scale and direct the budget to those areas that needed it most. As the reforms did not significantly impact the budget, there was money available to carry out the reforms and keep the machine running, especially in the areas of interest to the nation, like peacekeeping and professionalization.

#### **D. 2010-2014**

As the political pendulum started shifted back to the right, civil-military relations continued to progress. Even though the right wing was historically more aligned with the military's interests, reforms continued along similar paths as before.

##### **1. Shifting to the Right**

For the first time since its return to democracy, Chile had a right-wing civilian president in Sebastián Piñera. Just prior to his inauguration, Law 20424 was passed with

the intention of reforming the organization of the Ministry of National Defense. It then fell to the new president to carry it out and implement it. This reform was a huge change in how the Ministry was organized and it shifted responsibilities around, giving power over policy and planning to the Ministry instead of the Commanders in Chief.

Prior to the law in 2010, the only official paperwork establishing the Ministry of National Defense and delineating its responsibilities was a series of presidential decrees dating back to the military regime in the 1930s.<sup>121</sup> As such, there was no incentive to man the ministry with civilian defense experts and create a robust organization with the mission of providing policy or guidance or to examine and identify strategic goals or threats to the country; these missions fell to the admirals and generals running each service. The staffs with the personnel to pursue these objectives resided in the individual services, with the Ministry of National Defense serving as an administrative entity that would rubber stamp requests from the service chiefs.<sup>122</sup> Without the institutional knowledge and experience to critically examine proposals recommended by the services, the minister had no choice but to accept the argument presented by the services.

The method of organization within the ministry was also counterproductive. The Chief of the National Defense Staff, a three-star admiral or general who was tasked with promoting joint-ness among the services, was junior to the service chiefs and had no command authority within the military. His staff was composed of officers chosen by their respective services, many of which were about to retire, and the Chief of the National Defense Staff would himself return to his parent service after a two-year term to be subordinate to the service chief again. This organizational structure only enforced the inertial nature of the staff's work as they were incentivized to further their careers by promoting whatever their respective service chief wanted.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Tristan Dreisbach, "Civilians at the Helm: Chile Transforms Its Ministry of National Defense, 2010–2014," 2015, *Innovations for Successful Societies*, Princeton University, <https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu>, 2–3.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>123</sup> Dreisbach, "Civilians at the Helm," 4.

When unanimously approved by congress in 2010, the new law reorganized the ministry and delineated authorities and responsibilities to it. The Chief of the National Defense Staff became the Chief of the Joint Staff and was responsible to train joint troops. Under a declaration of war or crisis, the Chief of the Joint Staff would assume command authority over the troops assigned, in accordance with the approved war plans, to prosecute the conflict.<sup>124</sup> The new organization also included a streamlined ministry where there was one undersecretariat for the armed forces, rather than one per service. Most importantly, the ministry gained the personnel and legal authority to define and implement both policy and strategy.<sup>125</sup> This new authority was carried out by the Secretary of Defense which was initially staffed by civilians with prior MOD experience and retired military officers.

On the financial side, the new reform funneled all military funding through the Undersecretary of the Armed Forces, whether for pensions, salaries, promotions, acquisitions, or administration. It even granted the ability to perform audits on purchases for military equipment.<sup>126</sup> The restructuring eliminated the individual service staffs and consolidated them, which led to the individual services presenting annual budget requests to the undersecretary who then would propose a consolidated defense budget request to the Ministry of Economy for approval.<sup>127</sup> This combined budget shifted the emphasis from service desires to national, policy-driven requirements. As time went on and the ministry adapted to its new organization and responsibilities, it was able to perform a function of defense planning that had previously been absent, prioritizing and life-cycle costing defense projects, acquisitions, and operations.<sup>128</sup> The civilian leadership finally had the capacity to determine and direct the creation of the force that Chile wanted for the future.

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<sup>124</sup> Dreisbach, "Civilians at the Helm," 5, and Florina Cristiana Matei and Marcos Robledo, "Democratic Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness: Chile," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 288.

<sup>125</sup> Dreisbach, "Civilians at the Helm," 5–6.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 10

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>128</sup> Dreisbach, "Civilians at the Helm," 14.



This reform was a ground-breaking reform for Chile to substantially increase civilian control of the military not only in the present-day sense, but also in its future formation and direction. Budget concerns delayed fully staffing the new divisions within the ministry and civilian defense knowledge needed to be increased but Chile has taken great steps to remove the military prerogatives legally and culturally established prior to its return to democracy.

## **2. Military Effectiveness**

Considering the 2010 law that reorganized the Ministry of National Defense, it is easy to imagine that the Chilean military was finally reaching a position of effectiveness. Effectiveness is difficult to measure without major operations, however the large earthquake in February 2010 provided not only an opportunity to demonstrate the military's humanitarian assistance capabilities but also its ability to be subject to civilian authority and command in a domestic scenario. On all accounts, the military performed exemplary on all fronts. Once called to restore order, it required 9,000 soldiers only twelve hours to restore order to a population of two million.<sup>129</sup> Within ten days of the 8.8 quake, regular power and water had been restored to 90% of the affected homes.<sup>130</sup>

In other mission areas, Chile has maintained over 400 troops assigned under four different UN missions as far away as UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan.<sup>131</sup> The Cruz del Sur joint peacekeeping organization with Argentina has continued as troops continue to be trained at specific peacekeeping training centers in both Chile and Argentina. In January of 2014, in an effort to increase its capabilities and international relationships, Chile signed on to an agreement with the European Union to participate with the European crisis management operations.<sup>132</sup>

The defense budget in Chile has been confusing the effectiveness determination for several years. Chile has not been involved in a major combat operation in many years, and

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<sup>129</sup> Matei and Robledo, "Democratic Civilian Control," 291.

<sup>130</sup> Michael Warren, "Disaster Experts Praise Chile Earthquake Response," *Associated Press*, March 10, 2010, [http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/03/disaster\\_experts\\_praise\\_chile.html](http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/03/disaster_experts_praise_chile.html).

<sup>131</sup> Latin American Security and Defense Network, *A Comparative Atlas*, 167.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

while it has successfully modernized much of its forces, it only spends 10% of its defense budget on operations and maintenance.<sup>133</sup> This coincides with a defense budget that has been decreasing both in percent of GDP and percent of government expenditures.<sup>134</sup>

The army has downsized some of its inventory, but much of that has been in the form of retiring obsolete or aging equipment. The army now employs fewer transport aircraft and helicopters, though they now maintain fewer different platforms, allowing for more streamlined and efficient maintenance. Personnel levels did not fluctuate much though conscripts are not reported as such anymore as they are all volunteer service members.<sup>135</sup>

The navy redesignated one of its frigates as a destroyer, though the overall number of warships did not change. One of Chile's troop transport ships, an old U.S. *Newport* class LST, was decommissioned and replaced by a second-hand French *Foudre* class LSD. Chile also doubled its oiler inventory with the purchase of the *Almirante Montt*. The marines grew by approximately 15% and the navy acquired more combat aircraft for naval patrol missions.<sup>136</sup>

The air force has continued to modernize its aircraft inventory as it shifts to more F-16 fighters. By eliminating many of its myriad transport airframes, Chile has created a cheaper and more efficient maintenance and certification program for both fixed and rotary wing platforms.

Even considering the lower defense budget over the last several years, military effectiveness is determined to be high during this time period. There have been several domestic opportunities for the military to assist civil authorities in response to natural

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<sup>133</sup> "Defense Budgets", Jane's IHS, accessed March 3, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/Jdb/SearchResults.aspx>.

<sup>134</sup> "Military Expenditure (% of GDP)," The World Bank, accessed March 3, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2015&locations=CL&start=2010> and "Military Expenditures (% of Central Government Expenditures)," The World Bank, accessed March 3, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.ZS?end=2015&locations=CL&start=2010>.

<sup>135</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010*, 72–3 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2014* (Philadelphia: Routledge, 2014), 376.

<sup>136</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010*, 73 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2014*, 377.

disasters and UN mission participation continues to be sustained with intentions to increase. Through all of this, the civil society has shown its approval of the military through polls showing the 96% of society trusts the military.<sup>137</sup> Exercises have increased Chile's interoperability with other nations, though the exercises are heavily scripted, and Chile has conducted its own annual joint exercise *Huracán*, which also appears to be scripted and is only approximately a week long.<sup>138</sup> While these short, scripted exercises are limited in their benefit to effectiveness, they demonstrate progress and expose the military to other ways of operating. This exposure can only help to drive Chile's armed forces toward further civil-military reforms and increases in effectiveness on the battlefield.

Taking back the role of planning and policy from the military was an important step on the part of the government, but all sides seem to have handled it well and in stride. Having a cadre of civilians trained in defense issues, though limited in size, was of great benefit in the transition and in creating an initial group of knowledgeable individuals who could then pass on that information and experience to those who followed. Recently retired military officers also provided invaluable experience having already performed these roles in the past. The reforms during this period were not about placing more requirements on the military, and while responsibilities shifted, there was enough of a feeling of investment to ensure these newly civilianized tasks were properly accomplished. This buy-in, along with a large and mostly untouchable defense budget, allowed the military to continue on its path to increased professionalization and modernization, and thereby effectiveness.

## **E. ANALYSIS**

To determine the cumulative effect of the three variables on effectiveness, Table 1 lists each time period and compares the variables together. For the decisions not taken column, a score of Civil-Military (CM) indicates missed opportunities impacting areas

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<sup>137</sup> Matei and Robledo, "Democratic Civilian Control," 291.

<sup>138</sup> TeleSur, "Bolivia, Peru Accuse Chile of Acts of Intimidation," published December 8, 2015, <http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Bolivia-Peru-Accuse-Chile-of-Acts-of-Intimidation-20151208-0016.html>.

when civilians and the military work together, like the MOD or other government interactions, a score of Civilian (C) indicates decisions that were passed up regarding areas normally reserved for civilians, and a score of military (M) indicates errors of omission regarding the military realm. Under resources, a high score indicates sufficient money to fund annual needs and invest in modernization; a low score indicates financial crisis or restrictively small budget. Under resource allocation, a high score is indicative of a budget that spreads funds to more than just personnel costs and especially funds modernization and training. A low score demonstrates an inability to fund major modernization efforts, training, or operations. Effectiveness scores are high when a military can fully accomplish its primary and secondary mission(s) and low when they cannot accomplish their primary mission. A moderate score indicates only secondary mission capabilities with marginal primary mission capabilities.

Table 1. Analysis of Impacts on Chilean Military Effectiveness

Time Period	Decisions not taken (IV 1)	Resources (IV 2)	Resource Allocation (IV 3)	Effectiveness
1990-2000	C/CM	High	High	Moderate
2000-2010	C/CM	High	High	Moderate/High
2010-2014	C	High	High	High

As shown in Table 1, during the first decade, the main decisions not taken were eliminating the appointed senatorial seats and granting the President the ability to remove service Chiefs of Staff by his own authority, constituting a C/CM score. Under resources, Pinochet actually left the economy in decent shape when he stepped aside and it continued to grow under the civilian leadership. The government had the funds to pay their bills and had some left over to spend on acquisitions, earning a score of high. The allocation of resources was well placed as some modernization took place and after covering salaries, pensions, and training. Effectiveness was only graded as moderate during this period as much attention was being given to the political realm and internal

disagreements, rather than professionalization or training. On top of this maintained politicization, there was some significant downsizing in major capability areas during this time, even though they could still protect their borders.

During the second decade, the decisions not made were regarding repealing the Copper Law, which would have given the legislature complete control of the federal budget, and not strengthening the MOD or the Joint Staff to be an effective policy and planning entity, as opposed to an administrative one. While reforms were passed in the last months of the time period, they did not take effect until after the new government took power. Resources were still increasing as Chile's economy continued to grow. Allocation is graded as high as not only was Chile able to acquire F-16s from the United States, but was able to make other purchases of second-hand equipment that would fulfill the needs they had, rather than trying to buy the newest toy. The military's effectiveness score increased to a moderate/high during the 2000s as the military professionalized and started building its capabilities to match its missions. Conscription went away and forces were reduced to meet the needs and the budget of the MOD.

Under the right-leaning government, the last major hold-out in reforms continued to be the Copper Law. While there is an understood need to either adjust, or eliminate it, it has not yet occurred. Military expenditures continued to increase during this time period, regardless of a significant drop in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014, leading to a score of high. Allocations continued along the same trajectory as before, with plenty of reserved copper money for acquisitions and modernization projects, beyond the annual budget to support the forces. Effectiveness has been graded as high due to their possession of modern equipment, a professionalized force, and international training efforts. The funding has not been lacking for the armed forces to ensure it can accomplish all its mission areas.

The trend lines for all independent variables are either level or positive, and the dependent variable shows a steady, positive trend as well. This agrees with my hypothesis, though with only one independent variable changing, it does not provide data on any impact the other two may have had on effectiveness. Further case studies or an

expansion of the number of time periods under scrutiny may add more granularity and allow for more trend analysis.

## **F. CONCLUSION**

Over the last twenty-seven years, Chile has worked to consolidate civilian control of its military. The first decade was filled with failed attempts to amend legislation while the military started to update and upgrade its hardware. The decade after Pinochet's farewell from public life saw few changes, but changes that were very influential in removing the armed forces from Chile's political scene. A reinterpretation of the Copper Law also saw civilians regain some measure of control over the funds available to the military, though there was plenty of money still available to the military. Congress was not incentivized to create roadblocks for the military's modernization plans, and as such did not impede the armed forces' plans to continue with the purchase of newer platforms in conformance with its defensive mission. The inauguration of a right-wing government coincided with a fundamental restructuring of the Ministry of National Defense and civilians regained control of the planning and strategy-creating functions within the defense institution.

Overall, Chile has increased civilian control of the military and increased military effectiveness at the same time. The two main reasons for the increase in both categories is the understanding by the civilians that they benefit from having a capable, effective military force that is externally focused and the mostly unrestrained access to funding by the military in its efforts to trim its personnel and field a modern force that would be formidable against its comparably sized neighbors.

This chapter goes to show the impact that funding can have on the ability of a military to maintain a trained, modern force. This idea will be displayed in a more dramatic fashion in the next chapter, which will cover three time periods in Argentina and looking at both the reforms and the changes in military effectiveness for each period.

#### **IV. THE FINANCIAL COST OF DEFENSE REFORM IN ARGENTINA**

Just as Chile had to work through conflict between the civilian government and the military, Argentina also went through some rough patches. While there were some similar struggles, the two countries responded very differently, leading to very different results. Argentina chose to maintain an antagonistic stance toward the military much longer than Chile and when the antagonism ran out, apathy set in.

Throughout the twentieth century, Argentina has had multiple coups, yet since 1983, it has maintained its democratic nature. There are many reasons for this success story, such as it is, though a few stand out more than others. Civilian control of the military is part of the foundation of democracy and it was this control that politicians sought to gain in rapid fashion at the end of the *Proceso* military rule. Raul Alfonsín, Carlos Menem, and the husband/wife duo of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner all followed similar paths with similar successes. Alfonsín bounded the military's mission and brought the Ministry of Defense (MOD) into the picture while chopping the military budget. Menem ended conscription, created the process for strategic planning while loosely reorganizing the defense institution, and refocused the military on peacekeeping operations as a major mission area in the absence of external threats, all while sticking to an austerity plan that tightened the noose on the defense budget. The Kirchners gave teeth to the MOD, at least in a de jure way, and further moved the power away from the military service chiefs while neglecting to fund the MOD sufficiently to carry out any major restructuring or take on their newly assigned roles. Results came quickly in regaining civilian control, but so too did results from an atrophied budget that gained less and less attention from the government.

Argentina has made great steps toward establishing civilian control of the military; however, the chosen method of ensuring control has been to defund the military's O&M and R&D budgets, leaving them with outdated equipment that cannot be properly maintained. This chapter addresses the missions assigned to the military as well

as the major civil-military reforms and changes in military effectiveness during the three main time periods since Argentina's return to democracy.

#### **A. STATED MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES**

Argentina has amended its armed forces' missions over the decades, leading to the current set of missions that match up with western concepts of a civilian-controlled military. As stated on its Joint General Staff webpage, the primary mission of the armed forces is to "contribute to national defense, acting in a deterrent manner or through the effective use of military means, with the goal of protecting and permanently guaranteeing sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, capacity for self-determination, life and liberty of its inhabitants, and national resources in the face of risks and potential threats with an external origin."<sup>139</sup> Of specific interest in this mission statement is the emphasis and specificity that the mission is directed toward external threats, not internal ones.

The secondary missions given to the armed forces are threefold. Argentina has placed a high priority on participation in peacekeeping missions under the United Nations. It has also emphasized participation in the development of cooperation and the display of friendly intentions, both at the regional and global levels, with the goal of preventing conflict from starting. Last, while only authorized under specific situations as stipulated in law, the armed forces can operate inside the national borders on internal security missions.<sup>140</sup>

#### **B. 1983-1989**

The collapse of the Proceso government left Argentina in a delicate position economically and politically. There were a lot of raw emotions regarding the military and it did not take long to see the results of society's perspective of the military.

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<sup>139</sup> "Misión y Funciones," Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, accessed March 14, 2017, <http://www.fuerzas-armadas.mil.ar/Mision-y-Funciones.aspx>.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.



## 1. Antagonism

Raul Alfonsín became president of Argentina on December 10, 1983. Having not had time to get assurances from the *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR) party prior to Alfonsín's inauguration, the military found itself in a defensive position, facing a president who openly wanted to put many officers on trial for actions during the Dirty War and having only a self-pardon by the outgoing junta to protect them. The Alfonsín administration wasted no time in making it clear to the military and the rest of society that the civilians would keep the military accountable and that the military needing fixing.

Shortly after his inauguration, Alfonsín tasked the military judicial system with prosecuting those service members who were guilty of human rights violations during the junta's rule. Those who had led the guerilla groups were also prosecuted in short order.<sup>141</sup> He also established the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons to fully account for the scope of the junta's actions and try to give closure to those whom had lost loved ones. Many of the senior military leaders were dismissed and many were prosecuted. When the number of personnel being prosecuted began to balloon, the congress passed two laws to limit the scope to only those who had exceeded orders or given orders to violate human rights and to put a time limit on filing charges.<sup>142</sup> While not wholly successful in the eyes of anyone, this process showed that the military did not enjoy the impunity of the past.

Next on Alfonsín's agenda was to reform the defense institution itself. While he may not have gone as far as he wanted to in the scope of his reforms, he did get congress to pass the National Defense Law (no. 23554) in April of 1988. This law was the major reform passed by congress during the Alfonsín administration and codified many of the changes that had been made in the first days of Alfonsín's presidency.<sup>143</sup> The major change put forth in this law was the restriction of the military's missions to external

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<sup>141</sup> Julio Hang, "Argentina: A Transition Without Conditions," in *Military Engagement*, ed. Dennis C. Blair (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2013), Project Muse, 57.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 57–8.

<sup>143</sup> Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power*, 158.

threats.<sup>144</sup> Previously, the military was responsible for countering any threat to the nation, regardless of origin, and had on several occasions been used to counter groups operating within the country. In 1976, the military was ordered by the government to eradicate the subversive groups carrying out terrorist actions within the national borders.<sup>145</sup> This limitation to the military's area of concern has been criticized for not allowing the military to engage in domestic anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics efforts as other neighboring militaries do, but the decision was made in order to limit the military's ability to target civilians and to depoliticize them by keeping their focus outside the country.

The new defense law also changed things up within the military ranks. The service chiefs, previously operational in nature and holding the title of Commander in Chief of their respective services, were renamed Chiefs of Staff and subordinated to the Minister of Defense, whom in turn was the president's agent for defense matters. The defense law also created requirements for individual services to focus on becoming a joint military and to work with the Joint General Staff on all such matters, as the Joint Staff was tasked with coordinating and managing joint operations, doctrine, and logistics.<sup>146</sup>

Although already in practice since shortly after Alfonsín's inauguration, the Joint General Staff positions were elevated in rank to be senior to their service counterparts, though in practice it took many years to get the service staffs to rely on the Joint General Staff for anything of substance. Between its creation in 1949 and 1983, the Chief of the Joint General Staff was only a four-star general twice, while it was once filled by a Colonel. Since December 1983, it has always been filled by a four-star flag or general officer.<sup>147</sup> The new law gave the Joint General Staff a job, but it didn't give it much

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<sup>144</sup> "Defensa Nacional (Ley 23.554)," Información Legislativa, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/20000-24999/20988/texact.htm>.

<sup>145</sup> Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power*, 109n5.

<sup>146</sup> "Defensa Nacional (Ley 23.554)," Información Legislativa, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/20000-24999/20988/texact.htm>.

<sup>147</sup> "Listado de Autoridades Desde Su Creación Hasta la Actualidad," Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, accessed March 26, 2017, <http://www.fuerzas-armadas.mil.ar/Autoridades-Historicas.aspx>.

teeth. As a planning and management entity, it could not prevent the three services from ignoring its advice and going directly to the Defense Minister for approval of whatever they wanted. With an average length at the job of only about 16 months, most Defense Ministers did not have the experience or expertise to enforce any collaboration between the Joint General Staff and the services.<sup>148</sup>

From a civil-military relations perspective, this law was very important and hit many of the wickets that would be expected from this type of law. It strengthened civilian control of the military by shifting the military's focus away from politics and national level problems which in turn kept it from feeling obligated to intervene when things deteriorated. This effort was successful and though there were four rebellions, three under Alfonsín and one under Carlos Menem, none attempted to overthrow the government.<sup>149</sup> The new law also divided military leadership while strengthening the civilian-led upper level of the chain of command. While each service had its own arena, they were required to move their services into a more joint-minded operating posture. This could not be done without consultation with an equally ranked officer leading the Joint General Staff. Meanwhile, any ambiguity in the higher chain of command was eliminated by firmly placing the Defense Minister in line above the Joint General Staff and the service Chiefs of Staff as the president's representative, and was responsible for everything defense related that was able to be legally delegated. By splitting the military leadership and consolidating the civilian leadership, the balance of power in the defense institution shifted firmly in favor of the civilians.

Another boost to civilian power, or rather the reason any of the structure changes had any effect in their initial stages, was that the defense budget was firmly under the control of civilians. While the military leaders were allowed to make budget proposals and request funding for specific projects, there was no guarantee anyone in the Ministry of Defense (MOD) or the Ministry of Economics would approve it. With the previously bloated military budget and the financial crisis the junta had left the country in, there was little money available to the military. In his first two years in office, Alfonsín reduced

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<sup>148</sup> Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power*, 162.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

defense spending by 21%, and over 37% by the end of his presidency.<sup>150</sup> When combined with an inflation rate over 3000% in his last year in office, the reduced funds did not stretch as far as they would have in previous years.<sup>151</sup> The budget itself was controlled by the Minister of Economics and with the implementation of the Austral Plan, followed by its failure, the military took a back seat to almost everything else. The Alfonsín administration cut the 1982 wartime defense budget of 4.7% of Gross National Product (GNP) to a more reasonable 2.3%, though no specific, major reforms to the size of the military were enacted.<sup>152</sup>

## **2. Military Effectiveness**

While it is difficult to pinpoint the military's effectiveness, identifying the trend it followed during Alfonsín's presidency is not. Not all the services fared the same, though no one benefitted very much. The army was the worst hit by the budget cuts and as such the number of conscripts subsequently plummeted. Total army personnel dropped by 45% by 1989 and army conscripts fell from 80,000 to 30,000. Its organization was dropped from five to four corps, though in reality, while the corps was disbanded, the subordinate units simply moved into other corps. The structure did not change to match the finances. An order of locally produced tanks increased the main battle tank inventory, but the light tanks were almost halved, as were helicopters. Delivery on previous orders saw the armored personnel carrier (APC) inventory increase, and artillery units decreased slightly though part of the reduction was due to replacing some older pieces with newer ones. The army's transport aircraft inventory, however, was decimated to 27% of its 1983 inventory. Only the APCs and a portion of the artillery equipment showed any upgrading or modernizing trend.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power*, 117.

<sup>151</sup> "Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual %)," The World Bank, accessed March 26, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=AR>.

<sup>152</sup> Hang, "Argentina: A Transition Without Conditions," 57.

<sup>153</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1983–1984* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), 104 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1989–1990* (London: Brassey's for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), 182.

The navy did not fare much better. Of a pre-transition order of five submarines, only two were delivered before the rest of the order was cancelled. Argentina's only aircraft carrier was placed in major overhaul in 1989, from which it never left before being scrapped. Even considering the arrival of three destroyers in Alfonsín's first year in office, the navy still had less destroyers in 1989 than it did when he took office. An order of frigates was received, although almost sold off during financial hardships in 1986, but the navy still only had one troop transport of any size and it lost its oiler capability shortly after the transition.<sup>154</sup>

Naval aviation personnel dropped by one third, but it kept similar numbers of aircraft during the 1980s. This is not necessarily an encouraging fact, however, when one considers that most of their combat aircraft were built in the 1960s and did not go through a modernization period under Alfonsín either. Besides having their personnel cut in half and receiving an order of APCs like the army did early on, the marines were left alone, likely because not much else could be cut without losing them entirely.<sup>155</sup>

The air force seems to have fared the best of the three services. Despite losing half of its conscript personnel, the number of non-conscript personnel actually grew. Light aircraft for counterinsurgency and helicopter numbers increased while, similar to the army, transport aircraft diminished. Most of the air force's combat aircraft were retained, including seven of its eight bombers.<sup>156</sup>

There was no planning process in place for the MOD, and with a civilian workforce with no defense training or career progression within MOD, the military recommendations were usually accepted. The exception to this was when the military left it up to the civilians to dictate the way forward and were left waiting indefinitely as the civilians never produced guidance. This was the case with force restructuring in the face

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<sup>154</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1983–1984*, 104–5; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1986–1987* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), 177–8; and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1989–1990*, 182–3.

<sup>155</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1983–1984*, 105 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1989–1990*, 182–3.

<sup>156</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1983–1984*, 105 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1989–1990*, 183.

of such reduced budgets.<sup>157</sup> Also, when Alfonsín eliminated the border conflicts with Chile and Brazil, the military was left with not only no funding, but no direction, as those conflict scenarios had dominated defense policy and planning for several decades.<sup>158</sup> The incentive to prosecute was much stronger than the incentive to reform and make the defense institution an effective part of the government. The budget controls kept the civilians in charge, but they did not get nearly the return on investment that they could have because they did not ensure that the force structure matched the budget and was based on a strategic planning framework, which did not exist. Instead, they spent just over half the amount as previously to maintain the same force. For these reasons, military effectiveness during the Alfonsín administration is graded as having dropped from moderate/high to moderate.

In this series of reforms, the failure to increase effectiveness was not tied to the line items of the legislation, but the structural reforms that didn't follow the legislation and the severe economic problems throughout the country. With such a reduced budget, to not restructure the organization of the military was a huge oversight. Individual units were relegated to skeleton crews and while the joint idea was popular at the time, it did not materialize to any significant degree.

## **C. 1989-1999**

The transition to a new administration saw many changes across the spectrum of issues. Stability continued to be elusive, but that did not prevent the government from making progress in civil-military relations.

### **1. Redirection**

The financial turmoil of the late 1980s led to a changing of the guard as the Peronist Carlos Menem was elected. The emphasis of the Menem administration was quickly seen to be different from that of his predecessor Raul Alfonsín. With the rampant hyperinflation seen in 1989 leading to the early inauguration of Menem, it is clear that

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<sup>157</sup> Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power*, 170.

<sup>158</sup> Jorge Battaglini, "The Politics of Defense Revival in Argentina," *Defense and Security Analysis* 29, no. 1 (2013), 3, doi: 10.1080/14751798.760251.

Menem had to focus on the economy.<sup>159</sup> This focus was single-minded and placed fiscal austerity well ahead of any military desires and wishes. If the economy could not be controlled quickly there would not have been much of a society for the military to defend anyway. This is not to say he did not make changes within the defense institution. On the contrary, there were three reforms that took place under Menem that substantially changed the military: The Voluntary Military Service Act of 1995, the Armed Forces Reorganization Act of 1998, and the fundamental refocusing of the armed forces on peacekeeping operations under United Nations (UN) mandates.

The Voluntary Military Service Act was exactly that; it eliminated regular conscription and made the military a volunteer force. This is with an important caveat, if the MOD dictated numbers were not met in a given year and the administration so chose, it could submit to congress for permission to conscript people that were eighteen years old to make up the difference.<sup>160</sup> As this took congress passing a law to do, very few circumstances would merit the attempt. To enter this volunteer force, applicants had to be between 18–24 years of age, single, and Argentine citizens. Rather than creating a transition period to implement this law, congress gave two months to implement from the date of signature. This monumental task fell to the MOD which had to figure out who to keep, what to do with the current conscripts, and how to proceed with a new recruiting initiative to take the place of conscription. In the event of war or that conscription was needed to keep personnel numbers at desired levels, those who were conscientious objectors were obligated to the Substitutive Social Service to perform non-martial social duties. During times of war, even though they were not technically members of the military, the Substitutive Social Service members still fell under the military jurisdiction.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> Daniel Drosdoff, "Menem Accepts Alfonsín Offer to Take Office Early," *United Press International (UPI)*, June 13, 1989, <http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/06/13/Menem-accepts-Alfonsín-offer-to-take-office-early/3425613713600/?spt=su>.

<sup>160</sup> "Servicio Militar Voluntario (Ley 24.429)," *Información Legislativa*, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/802/norma.htm>.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*

Even after eliminating the conscription process in favor of an all-volunteer force, it still took three years to officially reorganize the military structure. When it finally happened, it was through a congressional mandate and placed the responsibility to carry it out on the MOD and the *Estado Mayor Conjunto* (EMC), or Joint General Staff, through a rapid, controlled timeline. This law mandated the creation of joint geographic commands that would carry out studies and strategic and operational forecasts regarding their respective areas. Infrastructure was consolidated and forces from various services were mandated to share bases and facilities as much as possible. The new law sought to increase the presence of civilian perspectives in military education through civilian professors at military training facilities and requiring civilian degrees for promotions.<sup>162</sup> A big portion of the change would be the elimination of excess administrative and bureaucratic structures within the forces, with an emphasis on using computers to minimize personnel for many of those tasks.

Finances are not missed, as the criteria for modernization and acquisition are laid out and the specific programs of emphasis for the MOD and armed forces are specifically called out. On a whole, this reform set the framework for the MOD to stipulate how it would carry out the requirements listed. Periodic reports were due to congress and the MOD and EMC both had specific items to accomplish within certain timelines, but the field organization change from 9 brigades in 1997 to 11 in 2000 within similar corps layouts demonstrates that downsizing did not occur in a time when personnel costs were prohibitively high, preventing modernization and acquisition in the economic turmoil that enveloped Argentina at the turn of the century.<sup>163</sup>

The third major shift made by the Menem administration was to shift the armed forces' focus from purely national defense to peacekeeping operations under UN mandates. This was possible on such a large scale because all of Argentina's continental border disputes had been resolved and Argentina had committed to pursuing its claim on

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<sup>162</sup> "Fuerzas Armadas (Ley 24.948)," Información Legislativa, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/50000-54999/50229/norma.htm>.

<sup>163</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1997/98* (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 205 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000–2001* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 227.



the Malvinas/Falkland Islands through strictly diplomatic means. This shift was not only a change in operational destinations for the forces selected to deploy, it included the creation of the *Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz* (CAECOPAZ), a training center devoted solely to training UN peacekeeping forces. This in turn created a change in identity among the armed forces in general, who began to see peacekeeping operations as valid military missions.<sup>164</sup>

Peacekeeping was not new to the Argentine military, but it had been a long time and there had never before been a training center devoted solely to this mission. The school was not just operated by the military; it included courses taught by other ministries of the government, civilian professors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well. Courses of study were up to twelve weeks long and covered topics ranging from international human rights to peaceful conflict resolution and negotiations.<sup>165</sup> It even included a lengthy course for media personnel going to hostile areas. While this new focus on peacekeeping could be seen as a distractor from the military's primary mission of territorial defense, there were several reasons and benefits for this decision. By eliminating the border disputes, the military had found itself without a credible threat to justify focusing solely on territorial defense. This left it languishing until Menem's foreign policy goals encouraged increased involvement in peacekeeping. This is one of the Argentine military's secondary missions and it exposed them to the professionalization requirements of the UN and other nations. Their training was geared toward being in a society without controlling it, even when that society was in shambles. These aspects make it great training and experience to socialize among the rest of the troops after the operational rotation was over.

In general, all three reforms increased civilian control of the military. By eliminating conscription, congress was able to set the requirements for entry into the volunteer military and would have to give approval to conscript members to meet

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<sup>164</sup> Katherine J. Worboys, "The Traumatic Journey from Dictatorship to Democracy: Peacekeeping Operations and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, 1989–1999," *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 149 (2007), 153, doi: 10.1177/0095327X05283843 and Arturo C. Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2013), 78.

<sup>165</sup> Sotomayor, *Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper*, 73–4.

accession goals.<sup>166</sup> The military would be less of a social factor as its impact would be limited to those who chose to enter the service, rather than large swaths of society who would then be exclusively subject to military education. The reorganization act also increased civilian control by using the power invested in congress to shape the military as it saw fit. It had multiple aspect of reorganization, and even though force size was not stipulated and structure was vague, the aspects that were included had specific goals attached to them with reporting requirements to keep congress apprised of the progress being made.<sup>167</sup> The mental and operational shift to peacekeeping operations benefitted civilian control as civilians were more involved in their training curricula, the military had less reason to push back for lack of anything else to do, and it took the focus off of the budget and previous rows over prosecution.

## **2. Military Effectiveness**

While the emphasis was placed on peacekeeping operations, that did not signify an increase to the military budget. If anything, it demonstrates the lack of attention paid to the regular forces who were not deploying in support of the UN that while great infrastructure and institutional capacity was being built up for peacekeeping, the military budget as a percentage of GDP dropped under Menem from 1.88% in 1989, to 1.22% in 1999.<sup>168</sup> For a structure that was built up under a budget of over 4% of GDP, it is easy to see how difficult operations and maintenance were under such tight fiscal constraints. While Argentina's GDP (PPP) increased by almost 60% during Menem's administration, increased personnel costs prevented much from being available for acquisitions and maintenance. In 1998, when Argentina's GDP (PPP) was at its highest Menem administration level, the military budget was at its lowest of 1.13% of GDP and

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<sup>166</sup> "Servicio Militar Voluntario (Ley 24.429)," Información Legislativa, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/802/norma.htm>.

<sup>167</sup> "Fuerzas Armadas (Ley 24.948)," Información Legislativa, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/50000-54999/50229/norma.htm>.

<sup>168</sup> "Military Expenditure (% of GDP)," The World Bank, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=1999&locations=AR&start=1989>.

Operations and Maintenance (O&M) received only 10% of the budget.<sup>169</sup> At no time during the second half of Menem's tenure was the O&M budget above 16%, and it was frequently lower.<sup>170</sup> During that same time period, acquisitions was never above 5.5% of the military's budget, more frequently finding itself closer to 2%.<sup>171</sup>

Salaries were low and unadjusted for inflation, and while conscript numbers dropped, units were not dissolved, leaving shells of units that were critically undermanned. Units in urban areas were even more undermanned as personnel, officer and enlisted, got second jobs to support their families. This created a part time syndrome in the military where people had to find ways to make a living, even if it meant leaving the barracks at noon to go into town for work.<sup>172</sup>

The army's equipment and platforms changed in a variety of directions during the Menem years. Army personnel dropped by over 25%, and that even before the end of conscription; personnel levels changed only minimally after 1993. Argentina had less than half as many main battle tanks at the end of the decade, but had somehow managed to purchase over one hundred light tanks. Artillery, APC, and transport aircraft numbers were all higher at the end of the decade, however the gains made early in the administration were already starting to fall off by the end. Helicopter numbers changed over the years but there is very little acquisition and no evidence of modernization.

Navy personnel numbers were anything but constant during the 1990s but ended up 20% lower in 1999 than in 1989. One submarine was struck from the records, and the

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<sup>169</sup> "GDP/PPP (Constant 2011 International \$)," The World Bank, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD?end=1999&locations=AR&start=1990>, "Military Expenditure (% of GDP)," The World Bank, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=1999&locations=AR&start=1989>, and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1998/99* (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 204.

<sup>170</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1995–1996* (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 202; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1996/97* (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 204; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1997/98*, 201; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1998/99*, 204, and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1999•2000* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 213.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> Herbert C. Huser, *Argentine Civil-Military Relations: From Alfonsín to Menem*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002, 149–152.

navy finally gave up the ghost on its only aircraft carrier. The navy also gave up its only LST transport ship and gained a used oiler, though it went straight into the shipyard for a refit. Naval aviation was not changed much though it had less than half of the initial number of Super Etendard fighter planes on the books by 1999. The marines fared the worst, as their personnel, APCs, and artillery all dropped by almost half during the 1990s.

The air force was downsized by almost a third and had little over half the fighter/ground attack aircraft that they had started with in 1989. The bomber capability was lost entirely, and while airborne tankers were acquired in 1994, half of those didn't make it to the end of the decade. Total number of transports did not change, however, in a small bit of good news, several of the platforms were new. This good news is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the air force maintained ten different transport platforms for a total of only 45 aircraft in 1999. With the differing maintenance and certifications required for each kind of aircraft, this did not allow the air force to maximize the use of its budget.

Aside from the military's order of battle, readiness was low in mission areas not related to peacekeeping. The military was able to keep high numbers of personnel equipped for UN missions around the world, but it was seemingly at the expense of anything else. Very few major acquisitions took place in the 1990s, and only a couple refit operations to revamp capabilities they already had. Training was mostly for the peacekeeping forces at CAECOPAZ, though there were two major joint exercises in 1997 and 1998. While significant in that they were truly joint in nature, the exercise in 1997 was a simulated UN peacekeeping operation<sup>173</sup> and as they were early steps toward joint operations in an area other than on paper, they were likely very scripted exercises. On the combined front, exercises increased substantially for the army and air force, while the navy doubled the number of exercises it participated in over previous years. In 1999, the three services participated in twenty-three combined exercises, though the size, length, and free-play nature of these exercises are dubious.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Huser, *Argentine Civil-Military Relations*, 179.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

While the Military Reorganization Act of 1998 was important, it was too late to bear fruit before the end of Menem's time in office, and there was no funding tied to it. With the static defense budget of the late 1990s, there just was not the available resources to keep to the timelines stipulated in the law and actually see much of it through.<sup>175</sup> Peacekeeping operations were successful and helpful for redirecting the military mindset, but much of those operations were funded by the UN and therefore immune to the austerity measures taking place domestically. This all equates to an odd setup where as a whole, the military was not very capable of performing normal state vs. state warfare because it could not afford it financially. When looking at the secondary mission of peacekeeping operations, however, the picture is very different and great strides were made to ensure Argentina could field a significant force to deploy where needed. Overall, the military effectiveness is graded as medium/low based on the ability of the military to successfully perform long term peacekeeping operations around the globe. Were it not for these successes, they would be graded as low due to a fundamental lack of operational capability with the funding that they had available. Professionalism was high, but without the resources to take the field and maintain equipment, that professionalism does not go far.

While the legislative reforms seem innocuous to effectiveness, the management and organizational decisions within the Ministry of Defense were confusing. While peacekeeping was a primary focus, it was not a primary mission. Having the funds and policies misaligned makes it difficult to improve an institution along intended lines. While the economic concerns kept the budget strictly controlled, there was no effort to match the size of the military to the budget, leading to part-time military with little support for its supposed primary mission.

#### **D. 2003-2015**

The advent of the Kirchner duo brought the severe turmoil of the new millennium to an end, but also brought new concerns. In some ways, there was a level of stability as

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<sup>175</sup> Huser, *Argentine Civil-Military Relations*, 188–189.

the economy got its feet back underneath itself, but not all gains made were permanent or shared with the MOD.

## **1. The Pink Tide**

In 2003, after several years of both economic maelstroms and presidential musical chairs, Nestor Kirchner (Kirchner) was elected from the Justicialist (Peronist) party. While this marked the beginning of more stable times in Argentina, the transition cannot be overlooked. That the military did not step in and take over the government when Argentina was struggling through the worst economic morass since the Great Depression speaks volumes about how the self-image of the military had changed since 1983. No longer did the military see itself as society's fixer, instead they fulfilled their true protector role and supported security forces where necessary, even distributing medicine and food, and delivering books to schools.<sup>176</sup> There were not even calls from the population or congress for the military to step in and remove the President.

Kirchner was much more leftist than his predecessors and was not as concerned with relations with the United States as Menem was. Even so, he was still interested in strengthening civilian control over the military institution. Though it had been passed into law in 1988, the National Defense Law had not been fully implemented<sup>177</sup> and many of the structures required in it were never created, mostly due to insufficient finances as the law was not tied to any source of funding. In order to reinforce the National Defense Law, Kirchner signed a presidential decree in December of 2006 to not only enforce the National Defense Law, but stipulate specifics that were not included in the law. These specifics covered authorities and responsibilities; things that were not clearly delineated in the 1988 law.

This decree firmly shifted control and power away from the individual military service chiefs and gave it to the MOD. As a result, the Chief of the Joint General Staff had peacetime command of the armed forces, the MOD gained the power to control

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<sup>176</sup> Hang, "Argentina: A Transition Without Conditions," 63–64.

<sup>177</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Asserting Civilian Control: Argentina," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 153.

promotions, and the strategic and operational planning criteria would now be developed in the MOD and then passed to the EMC to create the military planning documents.<sup>178</sup> These documents then were to be returned to the MOD for approval prior to enforcement. This decree also narrowed the military's primary mission to only those external threats that are from state actors through the use of armed forces.<sup>179</sup> The MOD was also given the power to establish new operational units, adjust budgets to fund any new units or requirements, and held the power over any defense related issue not specifically granted to another entity by law.

The other major change in the decree was the strengthening of the Joint General Staff and the National Defense Council. The EMC became a much more influential advisory group, and as the Chief of the EMC held peacetime command of the armed forces, he was able to force the individual services to conform to joint doctrine and planning. The National Defense Council became responsible for defining the strategic environment for the President through documents staffed by the MOD. To prepare these documents, the National Security Council had unfettered access to any ministry or public sector entity that maintained information necessary for their reports.<sup>180</sup>

This decree went a long way to increase civilian control of the military, even if it was almost two decades after democratization. By shifting the power to the MOD and giving the MOD strict oversight of the EMC, the civilians gained complete control over the formulation and/or approval of defense strategy, military strategy and doctrine, promotions, operational planning, and military structural organization. Unfortunately, gaining the institutional knowledge and expertise to properly wield these powers was not so easily accomplished.

In 2007, Nestor did not run for re-election, deciding instead to let his wife Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (Fernandez) run in his place. Many saw this as an attempt to circumvent presidential term limits, especially after Fernandez continued with many of

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<sup>178</sup> "Defensa Nacional (Decreto 727/2006)," Información Legislativa, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/115000-119999/116997/norma.htm>.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

the same policies that her husband had. While it was passed a month before her inauguration, Presidential Decree 1729 on the national defense planning cycle was to be implemented during the Fernandez administration. This document established the defense planning system with all its requisite documents and responsibilities. While there were some timeline-specific dates, most of the dates were regarding how often specific documents were required to be written. Beyond establishing a system of planning and documentation, it enshrines the civilians at the top of the process. Throughout the entire system, civilian leadership is at least involved, and in most cases the MOD is required to approve the documents drafted by the EMC. While not all the documents in this process are accessible to the public, those that are can be found online. What is not clear is whether the cycle has been completed. With the manning and financial concerns at the MOD, it is unclear whether it can afford to staff the required personnel to draft and maintain these living documents. While the Directive for National Defense Policy was signed both in 2009 and 2014, the decree approving the 2014 version titles it as merely an update, not a new document.<sup>181</sup>

Through strict budget control and the empowerment of the MOD over the military service chiefs, the Kirchner husband/wife duo certainly ensured that the military was beholden to their civilian masters. It appears that regardless of any other ambitions they may have had with the military, civilian control was the only success story they had.

## **2. Military Effectiveness**

Even though a modernization plan was implemented under the Kirchner/Fernandez presidencies, that did not lead to increases in military budgets as a percentage of GDP. As the GDP increased, so did the defense budget, but to a much smaller degree, leading the defense budget to drop from 1.06% of GDP in 2003 to 0.86% in 2015, with five of those years below 0.8%.<sup>182</sup> There were several acquisition plans throughout their twelve years in office, however few if any delivered the entire initial order if they were

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<sup>181</sup> “Ministerio de Defensa (Decreto 2645/2014),” Información Legislativa, accessed March 28, 2017, <http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/240000-244999/240966/norma.htm>.

<sup>182</sup> “Military Expenditure (% of GDP),” The World Bank, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2015&locations=AR&start=2003>.



not cancelled outright. By 2015, the O&M budget was a mere 7.9% of the defense budget, hardly enough to exercise and maintain equipment.<sup>183</sup> It is unclear whether there was any realistic expectation that modernization would occur in a meaningful way. With the financial problems that Argentina was going through after the turn of the century collapse and the debt issues that plagued it throughout the entire administration, preventing Argentina from accessing much of the international markets, there was little the Kirchner/Fernandez team could do until they cleaned house.

When looking at Argentina's military hardware, it is easy to see a trend of atrophy and neglect. The army's tank and artillery inventories decreased slightly and it lost over half of its transport aircraft along with almost 10% of its helicopters. Minor upgrades were made to some of the main and light tanks, but in each case less than ten tanks were actually upgraded.<sup>184</sup>

The navy fared little better. One destroyer was put into a fast troop transport role, removing it from a maritime combat role. One new frigate was acquired, but their make-shift amphibious ship was retired after a fire and one of Argentina's two oilers was decommissioned in 2015. Naval aviation has become a shell of its former self. Combat aircraft and helicopters were cut almost in half while training aircraft were cut by more than half. The only gains seen were in the acquisition of seven small transport planes. Even with all the platform cuts, the personnel numbers stayed the same. The marines lost almost half of their APCs but otherwise were left to drift.<sup>185</sup>

The air force saw the delivery of some locally produced light fighter aircraft but in 2015 Argentina retired the last of its Mirage III fighters with no replacement in sight. By the time they were retired, the Mirage IIIs could only fly during daylight with visual

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<sup>183</sup> "Defense Budgets," Jane's IHS, accessed March 20, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/Jdb/SearchResults.aspx>.

<sup>184</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2003•2004* (London: Oxford University Press, 2003), 178–9 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2015* (London: Routledge, 2015), 375–6.

<sup>185</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2003•2004*, 179 and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2015*, 376–7.

flight rules due to recurring avionics problems.<sup>186</sup> Only half of the training aircraft survived the administration although the numbers of transports and helicopters remained steady. Numbers are not everything, however with the financial issues in Argentina, experts thought only a few UH-1 helicopters and C-130s were operational out of the entire military transport fleet.<sup>187</sup> In 2013, financial problems caused the air force to cut flight hours almost in half, further deteriorating operational capabilities in an already exercise-deprived force. By 2015, the military was cutting man-hours and stopped performing maintenance on retired aircraft that were kept in inventory.<sup>188</sup>

With regard to the peacekeeping mission set, the news was good and bad. Budget cuts caused the training courses at CAECOPAZ to be slashed in both length and content.<sup>189</sup> Missions were able to continue because their funding came from the UN rather than the defense budget. In an effort to both save costs and increase political and military interaction, Argentina and Chile joined to create the *Cruz del Sur* (Southern Cross) Combined Peacekeeping unit in 2006. This unit alternates command between the two countries and is on standby for the UN in time of need.<sup>190</sup> Peacekeeping operations have continued to hold an important role for both the military and civilians. Due to funding constraints for the normal forces, it was likely the most training and practical experience they were receiving.

While the military is effective at its peacekeeping mission, this is secondary to territorial defense. Great strides have been made to make the Argentine peacekeeping units respected around the world, but unfortunately, the rest of the military has been left

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<sup>186</sup> “Formal Farewell for Argentine Malvinas Mirage Aircraft, After 40 Years Service,” *MercoPress*, August 17, 2015, <http://en.mercopress.com/2015/08/17/formal-farewell-for-argentine-malvinas-mirage-aircraft-after-40-years-service>.

<sup>187</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2008* (London: Routledge, 2008), 61.

<sup>188</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2016* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 369, 375.

<sup>189</sup> Sotomayor, *Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper*, 78–9.

<sup>190</sup> “Destinan \$30 Millones Para Operar Con Chile,” *La Nación*, March 18, 2008, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/996604-destinan-30-millones-para-operar-con-chile>.

to sit idly by. As a result of such low funding and the loss/age of key platforms, the military effectiveness has been graded as low.

It is unclear what the Kirchner/Fernandez duo's intentions were with the military, but what is very clear is the impact that a reduced budget has on an overmanned, underequipped force. The shifts to greater civilian control do not seem to have been the reason for such deterioration in the military's readiness or expected effectiveness. The guilty party in this case is the combination of two factors: the refusal to perform a complete overhaul of manning requirements based on a strategic understanding of the published policies, and a miniscule defense budget that did not allocate nearly enough to non-personnel costs.

## **E. ANALYSIS**

To determine the cumulative effect of the three variables on effectiveness, Table 2 lists each time period and compares the variables together. The scoring convention is the same for all tables.

Table 2. Analysis of Impacts on Argentine Military Effectiveness

Time Period	Decisions not taken (IV 1)	Resources (IV 2)	Resource Allocation (IV 3)	Effectiveness
1983-1989	CM/M	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
1989-1999	M/CM	Low	Moderate/Low	Moderate/Low
2003-2015	CM	Low/Moderate	Low	Low

As shown in Table 2, changes occur in all categories over time. In the 1980s, the major decisions not made were in both the military realm, not placing the EMC in the operational chain of command, and in the civil-military relations realm, by not creating a separate staff for the security council and not creating a career field for defense civilians at the MOD. Resources are listed as moderate because even though GDP continued to rise, inflation was out of control and had a large impact on available funds, not to

mention the defense budget cuts. A moderate score for resource allocation captures the fact that while the budget was cut, personnel were cut significantly as well, and some modernization was continued from the junta acquisitions. Effectiveness is listed as moderate as the size of the budget and personnel were slashed while leaving the unit structures untouched.

During the 1990s, the main decision point that was missed was structuring the end of conscription. As it was, it was rushed and there was no structure in place to replace the inflow of conscripts or to account for the sudden lack of personnel. The lack of a decision to fix the civilian career path and support the security council left the score as M/CM, switched in order only to demonstrate the impact of conscription ending. Resources bottomed out during the 1990s as the astronomical inflation forced the government to change currencies, scoring a deserved low. Resource allocation was still scored at moderate/low due to rising personnel costs and an inability to fully fund acquisition programs, even though a new training center was created for the peacekeeping units. Due to aging equipment and drastically reduced personnel with a miniscule operations budget, effectiveness was graded as moderate/low.

Under the Kirchner/Fernandez duo, the civilian defense career path has still not been addressed, earning a grade of CM. Resources were not very abundant but the economy was much more stable and growing, at least allowing the government to spend more on defense if it were to choose to do so. This stability and improving economy raised its score slightly to a low/moderate. The allocation of these funds did not improve and while the vast majority of funds went to salaries and pensions, acquisitions did not receive much attention. Effectiveness likewise dropped to a score of low as the military's ability to protect its borders is highly dubious.

Trend analysis for this case study gives much more data than the first case study did. Under the category of decisions not made, conditions did not change and then improved slightly. Resources got worse before improving slightly, though that improvement was due to GDP increase rather than a military budget increase, and allocation was on a steady decline. Effectiveness also showed a steady decline. In this

case study, resources and resource allocation showed a greater impact on effectiveness than the decisions variable did.

## **F. CONCLUSION**

Since 1983, Argentina has kept the military at bay and consolidated its democracy. This has been easily seen in the realm of civil-military relations as, throughout the economic crisis and of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century and the global financial crisis in 2008, there was not a whisper of the military stepping in to take over the government. This is a victory to be sure, but at what cost?

The military's mission was limited to external threats, which is not a bad thing if there is some other direction for them to focus. As this did not happen, the military was left not only with little in the way of money, but no direction to move to shape the military into an effective tool of the state. Conscription was ended in 1995 which drastically cut the personnel levels, but the structure was not modified to match the new, lower manning. While the military finally had a new mission in peacekeeping operations, much of which the UN paid for, the budget was not there to adequately support units that stayed in Argentina. Power shifted to firmly entrench civilians at the top of the political-military food chain, however neither acquisition nor operations and maintenance funding materialized to ensure that the military could field its equipment if it needed to.

Overall, while civilian control of the military increased, effectiveness of the military as a fighting force decreased. The only exception is in the secondary mission area of peacekeeping operations. The changes in effectiveness in the majority of the military was not an effect of the specific reforms enacted by the government. Instead, they lacked the funding required to fully carry out the reforms, equip the military with modern gear, and provide sufficient exercises beyond combined familiarization exercises. Within the peacekeeping realm, success was achieved in creating a viable mission area for the military to focus on and was funded as well as possible. This funding was sufficient only because the actual missions were paid for by the UN, not national coffers. Had Argentina allocated sufficient funding toward the MOD, their military could be a

substantial force in the region. This too comes with a price and the nation simply did not have enough money to go around.

Overall, Argentina has increased civilian control of the military but has decreased military effectiveness. The two main reasons for the decrease in effectiveness is that while personnel levels are certainly leaner than they were in 1983, the budget has been decimated and left at a very low level for many years, while the structure and manning has not been adequately reformed to be able to distribute the money outside of personnel requirements. Equipment and platforms are in many cases obsolete and the operations budget is not enough to ensure the military can train to the level necessary to accomplish its primary mission, were it necessary. The Argentine military may have an edge over the adversary in peacekeeping settings, but it does not compare well against its neighbors.

## **V. CONCLUSION**

### **A. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH**

The answer to this research question is significant for three reasons. First, when democratic governments are consolidating, administrations expend a large amount of time reining in the military in order to centralize the power of the government in the civilian leaders. The effects of these measures are studied in great detail as they pertain to the consolidation efforts of the government and its ability to maintain civilian control. The level of interest by many scholars in the impacts of these reforms on the effectiveness of their armed forces is lacking. This gap in research is not justified by treating it as minutia, especially considering that these resulting militaries are then routinely expected to be able to protect the nation's sovereignty, perform internal security missions, assist during natural disasters, spearhead counter-drug and counter-terror efforts, and perform peacekeeping operations around the world under United Nations auspices.

Second, those scholars who do look at military effectiveness do so in light of already having established some modicum of civilian control and are looking at how that control can be used to reform the military into an effective force. There is little data on how the reforms that granted initial civilian control impacted military effectiveness, which then necessitated further reform. If this could be determined, nations that are either solidifying civilian control or nations that are assisting in nation building could better understand the implications of the reforms they are making. This new understanding could potentially shorten the reform process or ensure the desired outcome is achieved by the reforms that are implemented, thereby helping consolidate power in civilian hands and prevent the military from attempting to retake power. It would be especially useful knowledge for the United States in its efforts to either nation-build after a conflict or build partner capacity in friendly nations.

Third, it can be argued that nation-building efforts by the United States have fallen short in their ability to convince the civilian authorities and military leaders that

they are in fact on the same team. One benefit of this research is its potential to inform policymakers of the effects that democratizing an authoritarian regime can have on their militaries moving forward. Perhaps the second round of reforms could be avoided if the effects of the first round were better understood ahead of time. This would enable the United States to recommend or implement policies in foreign countries that would shorten our involvement and limit the number of troops required, thus saving lives on both sides of the conflict and speeding up the healing process internal to the foreign country. This benefit would both engender good will on all sides and strengthen the United States' relationship with the international community, the local government, and the local population.

## **B. SLOW AND STEADY**

Chile's starting point in its journey toward civilian control of the armed forces was important for its future development. While Pinochet had been a military officer, the military itself had not been running every part of government. The most well-known example of civilian leadership is Pinochet's use of University of Chicago educated economists to help liberalize and open the economy in an effort to strengthen it. This tendency to place civilians in charge in many areas left the military able to stay cohesive, focused, and professionalized. This professionalization is a moving target, not an end state, and to that effort the elected governments of Aylwin and all his successors took steps to professionalize the entire institution, not only the warfighters themselves. The circumstances of the transition to democracy left the military somewhat defensive, which took time and effort to overcome, or rather, took the death of Pinochet to overcome.

In an effort to ensure that their new-found democracy would endure without armed intervention, the legislature and executive pushed measures to first remove the military from the political scene and later to draw out the guidance roles from uniformed hands and into the Ministry of National Defense. The Copper Law, while seen by many as a military holdout, has still not been reformed or eliminated, and the minimum budget allotted to the armed forces has been enough to allow it to become leaner and better suited for the missions assigned to it by civilians. While many have called for the



elimination of the Copper Law, those calls fall more in the vein of concerns over budgetary control, not because the legislature wants to bankrupt the armed forces.

In the case of Chile's reforms, civilian control was gained from the top down by shifting power laterally to civilians, not eliminating authorities, with the single exception of the appointed senatorial seats. These shifts were not accompanied by wholesale attacks or deterioration of the military, quite the opposite. Military hardware was still maintained, new platforms were purchased, and obsolete equipment was sold off to make room for modernized items. The timeline that it all occurred over also eased tensions as it was drawn out over several decades. These small steps allowed the changes to be more palatable to the military while still allowing for steady progress in civil-military relations. More importantly, it seems that the evolutionary changes gave the military time to buy into the proposed changes, with no shows of strength or threats after the death of Pinochet.

Society had some soul-searching to do as well, and the continuous progress made in civil-military relations let to a demonstration of the military's new ability to function in the domestic arena without forgetting whom they were supposed to be defending. The earthquake response was very well received on all fronts and has helped to mend the rifts between the general population and the military that had come out of the repression under Pinochet.

The steady, gradual pace of reform; the defense of the military as a necessary institution as seen through the chosen reforms; the steady, recurring budget with a known minimum value; and the eventual support and trust of society, all played a part in upholding the armed forces as an important institution while making the changes necessary to bring it in line with the vision society had for it. Chile's history as a regional example of democracy for much of the Twentieth Century also created an avenue to place the Pinochet dictatorship in a one-off category, not to be seen as a new norm.

### **C. SLASH AND BURN**

Argentina, a country with almost fifty years without a successful, peaceful transition of power, had an unenviable starting point from which to embark upon

democratic transition and consolidation. Notwithstanding this set of circumstances, democratic transitions have occurred without military influence since 1983. A military which had spent nearly as much time in power as it had in the barracks, has since hardly made a peep though economic maelstroms and government defaults.

When Alfonsín was inaugurated in December of 1983, he did not waste time in wresting the reins of power from the military. The government attacked the leaders of the Proceso regime through prosecution from the beginning, which did not allow the military as an institution to get its feet back under itself after realizing that not only had it failed to develop the nation as it had hoped, but it had been defeated on the battlefield for the first time in its history and had fallen from power.

Neither his nor his successors' reforms, however, were detrimental to the armed forces in and of themselves. Power shifted to the Ministry of Defense and the Joint General Staff was empowered to bring the perpetually bickering services together, but the *de jure* institution did not match the *de facto* institution. Very little defense knowledge and expertise existed in the civilian realm, which prevented any of the short-lived Ministers of Defense from being able to wrangle the bloated military in line with national objectives and missions. It was not until the emphasis was placed on peacekeeping that any forward progress was made in increasing capacity within the three services.

When Néstor Kirchner finally gave some teeth to the Alfonsín reforms, the military benefitted from a solidified chain of command, and later changes established a planning process for developing national and military defense strategies, but these were not enough to reset the situation. Argentina no longer had the same conflict scenarios to base their manning and organization; Chile and Brazil were no longer threats. What dragged the military down was not the reforms that occurred, but those that didn't. The military never went through a major restructuring after the elimination of its border disputes. The missions it had been assigned stayed the same, but there was still no reevaluation of how the nation would make use of the military on a daily level. Peacekeeping was the best option to keep the military employed, but even then, the military was not restructured to accommodate this. Personnel were drawn in from units across the country that met the UN requirements and placed into peacekeeping units

which then dispersed again upon returning to Argentina. While this was beneficial in increasing the average exposure of the military to other militaries and ways of operating, it did not take advantage of this mission set to reshape the armed forces.

The other catalyst for the degradation of the military was the wholesale slashing of the budget. While in many instances this could not be avoided, the tendency to just let that issue burn itself out led to a grossly oversized military for the available budget. Personnel are expensive, especially in a professionalized military, and when Argentina eliminated conscription in 1994, they had a perfect opportunity to reshape and resize the military to match what funds they had available. This opportunity was lost, or ignored, and the armed forces continued to fade into institutional irrelevance. With such a relatively large military, Argentina spends most of its tiny military budget on salaries and pensions. While hugely important, personnel alone cannot sustain a military in any semblance of a fighting condition. By not investing in acquisition and R&D, Argentina's military has been relegated to continue fighting with equipment generations older than their counterparts in other, smaller, Latin American militaries.

#### **D. ANALYSIS**

To determine the cumulative effect of the three variables on effectiveness, Table 3 combines the first two tables to better compare the various time periods. This combined table allows for better trend analysis across the two cases.

Table 3. Combined Analysis of Impacts on Military Effectiveness

Time Period	Decisions not taken (IV 1)	Resources (IV 2)	Resource Allocation (IV 3)	Effectiveness
Chile				
1990-2000	C/CM	High	High	Moderate
2000-2010	C/CM	High	High	Moderate/High
2010-2014	C	High	High	High
Argentina				
1983-1989	M/CM	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
1989-1999	M/CM	Low	Moderate/Low	Moderate/Low
2003-2015	CM	Low/Moderate	Low	Low

At first glance, both decisions not taken and resource allocation are directly related to effectiveness. In the Chile case study, as the decisions category improves, so does effectiveness. In this case, it is difficult to determine how strong the impact is, if there is any, as a lasting high score in both resources and allocation could have a continuing effect as well. This stronger impact of resources and allocation is demonstrated in the Argentina case study as, even though decisions improve, overall effectiveness declines, following the resource and allocation trend lines. The Argentina case demonstrates that resources and/or allocation are vital, however it is not clear which had the greater impact as they both trended together. It could be that only one is important because the other will follow or not have a separate effect. More research that includes a case study where they do not trend together would help to split the two variables and better assign value to them. What cannot be denied is that money management is a vital factor in having an effective military. Logic helps us assign value to them both at the extremes, but no country has so much money that it does not matter how they spend it, and no country can fund an effective military without spending

substantial amounts of money on it. Further case studies will be required to fill in the middle ground.

## **E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

As the United States continues to aid nations in consolidating democracy and assisting in developing capable and effective armed forces, it would be good to keep some lessons in mind that were learned from these case studies. First, nations are not able to reform culture and society as quickly as they can reform laws, which leads to piecemeal reforms. The United States needs to keep in mind that the order in which these piecemeal reforms take place can matter. Second, regardless of how successful a reform package was in a certain country, there is no reason to believe it will be successful in another country without modifying it to the needs, desires, and capacities of the country.

### **1. The Order of Things**

Chile's process and choices of action and inaction in various areas were not perfect, however, the order and degree to which they occurred have propelled Chile toward not only greater civilian control of the military, but also military effectiveness. Chile kept its military funded while making adjustments, which allowed the ideas to be tested without being undermined by budgetary constraints. This was not necessarily intentional, as the legislature had and still has limited control over the military budget, however the outcome demonstrated the importance of the principle.

In Argentina, the economy drove the military budget into the ground, and while the reforms were put into place, it is difficult to measure their potential due to a lack of money and defense expertise in the civilian workforce. This problem was not chosen by the Argentine government, however its impact on reform is undeniable. While pressures push regimes to place their militaries in a box as quickly as possible, it would seem that there are prerequisites to gaining the intended benefits from this idea. If the nation does not first decide what direction to set for the military, it will either languish in poverty or futilely attempt to accomplish a colossal feat with miniscule means. Similarly, if power is wrested from the military and a new direction is dictated, but the structure of the military does not match the mission given to it, there will be severe growing pains if not outright

inability to adapt. Governments must keep in mind that it is not the size of the military that makes it a force to be reckoned with, it is its ethos, training, equipment, professionalism, dedication, and belief that they are doing what others cannot, among other things. It is important to note that many of these items listed require not insignificant amounts of money to provide for an institution like the armed forces.

## **2. One Problem Is Wicked, Having Two is Downright Hard**

The difficulty in trying to have a global set of policies that countries should follow when consolidating democracy is that not only do states have different resources available to them, they are each working off of a different starting point. Cultures are always unique, relationships between individuals in power are unique, not to mention the relationships between institutions, and each state has different goals that it is working toward. This combines to make consolidation, and by extension the ideal of civilian supremacy along with military effectiveness, a wicked problem.

Wicked problems are those that are complex challenges that are not solvable. Common traits of a wicked problem are: the problem is not understood until it is solved; a good enough solution is all it takes to stop problem-solving; solutions are graded as better or worse, not true or false; there is no test of a solution as every wicked problem is unique; every solution is a one-shot opportunity, there is no trial and error learning; there is a high cost of failure, however, you must try solutions to learn about the problem; and are a symptom of another problem.<sup>191</sup> This concept demonstrates that while states can see the effects certain reforms cause in one country, it does not mean they can expect the same, or even similar, results in their own. Each state's efforts to reform their civil-military relations is a unique problem set. Trying the same reform at two different points in time will give differing results as well.

In a similar fashion, the United States cannot use a cookie-cutter policy to recommend reforms or even establish end state goals as the local actors' good enough solution may differ significantly from that of U.S. policy makers'. Failures in this regard are enlightening, but in a limited fashion. Just because a particular policy does not work

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<sup>191</sup> Kenneth J. Menkhaus, "State Fragility as a Wicked Problem," *PRISM* 1 (2010): 86.

in one country does not mean it will not work in another country. For the same reason, a policy that works in one country is not guaranteed to work anywhere else in the world. If the United States attempts to create a bag of options to try one at a time, it will fail every time. Instead, while beyond the scope of this thesis, the United States needs to create a framework within which to evaluate as best as possible not only the starting point and the likely paths forward, but the desired outcome of each stakeholder in the host nation. While not a guarantee for success, it will at least frame the problem in such a way as to eliminate as many bad ideas as possible. From there, assistance offered by the United States could be tailored based on the expected needs and intentions of the local elites.

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